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ABSTRACT 
When people view facial expressions of emotion they tend to mimic or mirror the 
expression. According to Leventhal's perceptual-motor theory of emotion, this response 
occurs when innate central motor programmes are activated. There is evidence that 
individuals with psychopathic traits have impaired autonomic responses to and recognition 
of emotional expressions. There is further evidence that individuals who lack empathy 
show reduced mirroring to facial expressions of emotion. This research piloted a method to 
investigate the facial responses of a group of eleven prisoners on the Dangerous and Severe 
Personality Disorder (DSPD) Programme at HMP Whitemoor. Participants in this group 
had elevated Psychopathy Checklist - Revised (PCL-R) scores (Mean = 28.4, SD = 3.6). 
Two control groups were recruited: prisoners who were not on the DSPD Programme (N = 
9), and a group of university employees and students (N = 10). Participants were filmed as 
they completed a facial affect recognition task using dynamic, spontaneous facial 
expressions of emotion as stimuli. The presence or absence of mirroring was determined by 
two independent raters. Because interrater reliability was low (Mean Cohen 's K=0.28, SD 
= 0.15), ratings were analysed separately. Non-parametric tests were used to investigate 
differences in group means for all analyses except for recognition, as only these data met 
parametric assumptions. There were no group differences in mirroring at the 5% level. 
However, group differences between university controls and prison controls approached 
significance, with more mirroring of happiness (both raters) and disgust (one rater only) in 
the university controls. Differences between the DSPD group and university controls on 
these measures were also (nonsignificantly) in the predicted direction. Supplementary 
analyses found higher recognition of anger in the normal controls than in the prison 
controls. There was no association between mirroring and recognition, and there were no 
group differences in emotional sensitivity based on strength ratings for the stimuli; 
however, university participants selected more emotional classes per trial than either of the 
two prison groups. It is proposed that in order to measure possible deficits in both mirroring 
and recognition, it may be necessary to use a combination of extreme and moderate facial 
stimuli, balanced across emotional classes. The potential application of this method to the 
assessment of mirroring in DSPD, and also to the evaluation of treatment, is discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study brings together research on psychopathy, antisocial personality disorder and 
Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder (DSPD), research looking at facial responses 
to facial expressions of emotion, and the facial affect recognition task. The research offers 
contributions that are consistent with two of the three priorities that have been set by the 
Home Office for DSPD research: improve knowledge around the causes of Personality 
Disorder (PD), and evaluate specific DSPD assessment and treatment programmes. A 
practical method for assessing emotional recognition and facial responses is piloted. It is 
hoped that from this research mechanisms may be inferred that contribute to our 
understanding of DSPD. From a clinical perspective, this research may suggest areas of 
deficit in individuals who meet the criteria for DSPD, while the method could be developed 
to evaluate the outcomes of treatments that target these deficits. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Psychopathy 
According to Cleckley, author of arguably the most influential book on the subject of 
psychopathy and the first person to describe the label in clinical terms, psychopaths are 
rationally and cognitively intact individuals, who are unable to appreciate the emotional 
significance of human behaviour (The Mask of Sanity; Cleckley, 1976). Psychopaths are 
characterized by Cleckley as callous, possessing a diminished capacity for remorse, 
superficial charm, a lack of empathy, proneness to boredom, and impulsivity. 
In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual: 4th Edition Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000), antisocial personality disorder (APD) is firmly 
related to, but not synonymous with, psychopathy. Among adult prisoners, the vast 
majority of individuals who are psychopathic according to the PCL-R meet the criteria for 
APD, while only approximately 25% who meet the criteria for APD are also designated as 
psychopaths (Hare, Hart, and Harpur, 1991). Psychopathy is in fact defined as a score of 30 
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or above on the Hare Psychopathy Checklist - Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991), a clinician- 
scored rating scale developed by Robert Hare and based in large part on Cleckley's original 
conceptualisation. 
In the PCL-R manual, Hare (1991) proposed that a score of 30 or above (out of 40) should 
be used to classify psychopaths, corresponding to a score around the 75th percentile for 
offenders. However, researchers have found that lower cutoffs can provide a more optimal 
division of groups of individuals into psychopaths and nonpsychopaths. For example, 
Harris, Rice, and Quinsey (1994) reported that a PCL-R cutoff of 19-20 maximised the hit- 
rate (minimising false positives and false negatives) in a sample of 653 serious offenders, 
while applying a cutoff of 25 yielded a "nearly pure" subsample (Harris et al., 1994; p395). 
In an earlier study, Harris, Rice, and Cormier (1991) indicated that in a group of 169 adult 
male offenders with mental health problems, a cutoff of 30 did not improve the prediction 
of reoffending over a cutoff of 25. Cooke and Michie (1997) used item response theory to 
analyse PCL-R data from a sample of 2,067 North American prisoners and forensic 
patients, and concluded that discrimination was maximized by this reduced cutoff. 
Moreover, in a study comparing North American and Scottish forensic samples, Cooke and 
Michie (1999) found that in order to establish metric equivalence between the two samples, 
it was necessary to reduce the cutoff for the Scottish sample to 25. 
Initial factor analyses of behaviours rated on the PCL-R revealed two independent factors: 
an emotion dysfunction factor defined largely by emotional shallowness and lack of guilt, 
and an antisocial behaviour factor defined largely by instrumental aggression and criminal 
behaviours (Hare et al., 1991). APD is more closely related to the latter, behavioural factor. 
The diagnosis largely ignores the affective and interpersonal characteristics of Factor 1, 
helping in part to explain the diagnostic asymmetry between the two labels. The two 
psychopathy factors have been emphasised in much of the subsequent literature; however, 
in a substantial review and re-analysis of the data Cooke and Michie (2001) concluded that 
three factors give a better description of the data: Arrogant and Deceitful Interpersonal 
Style, Deficient Affective Experience, and Impulsive and Irresponsible Behavioural Style. 
This revision received some criticism for its exclusion of items relating to antisocial 
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behaviour, and in the recently published manual to the 2nd Edition of the PCL-R, Hare 
appears to acknowledge both Cooke and Michie's refinement in addition to these concerns 
by proposing a 4-factor model (Hare, 2003). The critical difference with Hare's model is 
the inclusion of an antisocial factor, in addition to the interpersonal, affective, and 
impulsive/irresponsible factors. 
The PCL-R has been found to be both reliable and valid in a number of studies across 
several populations (e. g., Hare, Harpur, Hakstian, Forth, Hart, and Newman, 1990, 
analysed data from five prison samples; Vitale and Newman, 2001, reviewed the use of the 
PCL-R with female institutionalized and non-institutionalised samples; Molto, Poy, and 
Torrubia, 2000, looked at a Spanish prison sample; for reviews, see Salekin, Rogers, and 
Sewell, 1996; Hare, 2003). The PCL-R has been shown to have good predictive validity for 
a variety of antisocial behaviors, including criminal violence (Cooke and Michie, 1997), 
violent recidivism following release from prison or hospital (Harris, Rice, and Quinsey, 
1993), and poor treatment response to correctional treatment programs (Ogloff, Wong, and 
Greenwood, 1990). 
One of the main criticisms of the PCL-R is its lack of applicability to non-forensic 
populations, primarily because of the inclusion of behavioural criteria that apply 
exclusively to prisoners - specifically "revocation of conditional release" and "criminal 
versatility". The instrument has also been criticized for its use of the term psychopath, a 
label some have argued carries emotional baggage (Gendreau, Goggin, and Smith, 2002). 
On a more practical note, Gendreau et al. argue that it can be difficult and cumbersome to 
use, requiring up to two hours to administer and graduate level of qualification. With 
respect to the former point, it could be argued that the negative connotations of the term 
psychopath stem more from the behaviours and affective components that underpin the 
label, rather than because of the term itself. According to this reasoning, changing the label 
would simply lead, in time, to a new negatively-charged term for these individuals. On the 
latter point, there may be some tacit acknowledgement (in the face of explicit denials, for 
example, Hemphill and Hare, 2004) from Hare that the time required for administration is 
considerable, with the development of the shorter PCL - Short Version (PCL-SV; Hart, 
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Cox, and Hare, 1995). Nonetheless, contentions and limitations notwithstanding, the PCL- 
R has been used in more psychopathy research than any other measure and - particularly 
when it is used with the forensic populations on which it has been most thoroughly 
validated - is generally recognized as the most valid and useful instrument to assess 
psychopathy (Fulero, 1995; Stone, 1995). 
Personality disorder 
In addition to antisocial personality disorder, which is associated with psychopathy, there 
are nine other personality disorder diagnoses included in Axis II of DSM-IV-TR. These are 
arranged into three clusters based on theoretically similar underlying pathology. Cluster A 
personality disorders (paranoid, schizoid, and schizotypal) are characterized by odd or 
eccentric behaviours, Cluster B (antisocial, borderline, histrionic, and narcissistic) by 
dramatic or erratic behaviours, and Cluster C (avoidant, dependent, and obsessive- 
compulsive) by anxious or inhibited behaviours. There are also two additional personality 
disorders in an appendix: depressive personality disorder and passive-aggressive 
personality disorder. Pending further empirical support, these latter two disorders may 
appear in the main body of DSM-V. Finally, there is a diagnosis of personality disorder not 
otherwise specified, for cases which come close to meeting the requirements of one or more 
personality disorders, but do not fulfill the sufficient number of criteria in any one disorder. 
Diagnosis, as with Axis I disorders, is categorical and primarily comprises behaviours. In 
contrast with the major mental disorders of Axis I, however, there is an age restriction 
insofar as onset must be no later than early adulthood. 
One of the features purported to distinguish the personality disorders from mental illness is 
that the former are held to be present and relatively stable throughout adulthood. However, 
it has become increasingly apparent that the same can be said for a proportion of the cases 
of mental illnesses, e. g., schizophrenia (Shea and Yen, 2003). Conversely, there is evidence 
that personality traits can in fact change over time, to the extent that a person may meet the 
criteria for a personality disorder at one stage in life, but not at a later stage, without a 
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therapeutic intervention (Shea, Stout, Gunderson, Morey, Grilo, McGlashen, Skodol, 
Dolan-Sewell, Dick, Zanarini, and Keller, 2002). The distinction between Axis I and Axis 
II disorders is confused further by the fact that the presence of an Axis I condition, such as 
depression, can impact on whether a personality disorder is diagnosed (Shea and Yen, 
2003). 
Perhaps the greatest conceptual challenge facing personality disorders - as they are 
currently conceived - is the fact that the presence of features from multiple personality 
disorder diagnoses are the rule for individual patients, rather than the exception (Oldham, 
Skodol, Kellman, Hyler, Rosnick, and Davies, 1992). Alternatively, people may exhibit 
features from a number of different diagnoses, while not fulfilling the required number of 
criteria for any one. One of the aims during the development of the classification system 
was to make the diagnoses as distinguishable as possible; however, in creating the 
prototypical syndromes of the current DSM, the (misleading) impression is created that 
pure types should regularly be seen in clinical practice. 
Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder 
The term Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder (DSPD) was first used in a British 
Department of Health (DoH) and Home Office (HO) paper, Managing Dangerous People 
with Severe Personality Disorder (DoH, HO, 1999), which made proposals to detain and 
treat a small minority of offenders. It is not at present a clinical or legal term, but is 
described as a "working definition to describe the very small group of people with a severe 
personality disorder who, because of their disorder, also pose a significant risk of serious 
harm to others" (Warren, Preedy-Fayers, McGauley, Pickering, Norton, Geddes, and 
Dolan, 2003, p4). 
A year after the release of the DoH/HO paper, the Government's proposals to manage 
dangerous people with severe personality disorder were to include a research programme to 
build a sound evidence base from which to develop DSPD services. A large review of the 
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literature on treatment of psychopathy and personality disorders had concluded that the 
evidence for treatability was limited to a small number of studies, themselves limited by 
poor methodology (Dolan and Cold, 1993). In a subsequent review, taking into account the 
period from 1993 to 2001 in addition to the data covered by Dolan and Coid, similar 
conclusions were reached and the quality of evidence for the treatment of severe and/or 
dangerous personality disorders in particular was found to be poor (Warren et al., 2003). 
In an effort to address the empirical gaps in our knowledge an expert group, set up to advise 
the DSPD programme, set out the following three priorities for DSPD research: 
1. Improve knowledge around the causes of Personality Disorder (PD) 
2. Explore the relationship between PD and serious offending behaviour 
3. Evaluate specific DSPD assessment and treatment programmes 
Four new specialist services have now been set up as pilots around England to treat 
offenders who have been assessed as having a dangerous and severe personality disorder: 
HMP Whitemoor, HMP Frankland, Broadmoor Hospital, and Rampton Hospital. HMP 
Whitemoor was the first, and is currently developing and constantly evaluating a 
psychological treatment model based on a four-stage treatment model incorporating the 
following sequence of phases: problem recognition; exploration; acquisition of alternative 
behaviours; and consolidation and generalization (Livesley, 2001). An additional stage, 
engagement, has been added to the model at HMP Whitemoor. This is intended to highlight 
the fact that more emotionally damaged individuals can find it much more difficult to 
engage in the therapeutic alliance, with particular emphasis on moving beyond a superficial 
commitment required for meeting targets set by a parole board, towards gaining an 
understanding of what it means to engage emotionally or to have a meaningful, internally 
driven desire for change. 
15 
Empathy 
The word empathy, a construct believed to be fundamentally lacking in the psychopath 
(Hare, 1991) can be traced back to the German word Einfühlung, which was put forward by 
Robert Vischer (1873; in Listowel, 1934) to mean the spontaneous projection of real 
psychic feeling into the people and things they perceive. Lipps (1903; in Wispe, 1987) 
developed the theory, suggesting that people knew and responded to each other through 
Einfühlung, which was preceded by projection and imitation, and that as imitation of affect 
increases Einfühlung increases. The English word empathy was coined in 1909 by 
Titchener and defined as a "process of humanising objects, of reading or feeling ourselves 
into them" (Titchener, 1924). According to Leventhal's (1984) hierarchical perceptual- 
motor theory of emotion, this imitation would be biologically prepared in the form of innate 
central motor programs (the first level of the model). Interactive experiences between an 
individual and other people throughout development would feed into the second level, that 
of schematic motor codes, which would serve to enhance a person's imitative responses 
(see Fig. 1). 
Typical situational Hierarchical Feed forward 
stimuli processing system system 
CNS hierarchy 
Verbal messages ý-'-ºj 1. Conceptual level 
(Propositional) 
Facial expressions 2. Schematic level 0 Feed forward 
` (Perceptual-motor system 
ý.; codes) 
Specific stimulus 3. Expressive-motor 
properties (face, level (Innate central 
voice tone, loud motor programs) 
noise, etc. ) II _º 
Visceral system 
Cardiac activity 
Gastrointestinal activity 
Sweat gland activity, etc. 
Emotional 
responses 
Experience of 
emotion 
Facial expression 
Visceral reactions 
Fig. 1: Model of the hierarchical processing system for the construction of emotional reactions 
(based on Leventhal, 1984). 
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Leventhal stresses that while peripheral or motor activity, including facial-motor, is not 
necessary for emotional experience and behaviour, such activity does feed back into and is 
integrated with emotional processing with the usual effect of intensifying emotional 
experience. 
Measuring empathy 
In their review of empathy research Duan and Hill (1996) list several measures, including 
those that focus on the purely cognitive (e. g., Hogan, 1969; Truax and Carkhuff, 1967), 
those that conceptualise empathy as affective (e. g., Eisenberg, Fabes, Bustamante, and 
Mathy, 1987; Feschbach and Roe, 1968; Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972) and a measure that 
takes both cognitive and affective aspects into account (Davis, 1980). Duan and Hill 
question the validity of the available measures. They observe that self-report measures are 
limited by "human perception errors" (p. 264), whereby a person may believe that they 
understand or are understood by another, but this may in fact not be reciprocated. Observer 
ratings, on the other hand, focus on the outward expression of what is taken to be an inner 
experience, and such methods may be confounded by the clinician's communication skills. 
There is empirical support for a lack of empathy in psychopathy using standard empathy 
measures, e. g., Zagon and Jackson (1994) found in a group of 149 students that, overall, 
those scoring higher on a measure of psychopathy scored lower on a measure of empathy. 
In a study of conduct-disordered adolescents Cohen and Strayer (1996) investigated the 
relationship between empathy and conduct disorder, a disorder defined by DSM-IV-TR as a 
necessary but not sufficient precursor of antisocial personality disorder. They found that 
empathy was lower among conduct-disordered than comparison adolescents and was 
related inversely to antisocial and aggressive attitudes. And finally, in a review of studies 
looking at the association between empathy and aggressive or antisocial behaviour - 
characteristics of Hare's Factor 2- Miller and Eisenberg (1988) found them to be 
negatively related. 
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Facial responses to facial expressions of emotion and empathy 
Mirroring and counter-mirroring 
Nearly 100 years ago Lipps (1907; in Hess and Blairy, 2001) suggested that when 
presented with a facial expression of emotion, mirroring (sometimes referred to in the 
literature as imitation or mimicry) leads - via a feedback process - to emotional contagion, 
which in turn facilitates emotional recognition. Rogers (1957) linked mirroring and 
empathy in the context of the actions of the counselor in response to a client, while in social 
psychology the nonverbal communication of emotion is generally assumed to occur 
primarily through the face (Lanzetta and Englis, 1989). 
Mirroring is assumed to occur automatically as a response to observed facial expressions 
(Hoffman, 1984). This is consistent with the first two levels of Leventhal's model, with the 
innate central motor programs (first level) being triggered by facial stimuli, and experiences 
during development leading to a refinement of the responses, which remain automatic 
(second level). These two aspects of the perceptual-motor theory of emotion - that it is 
developmental, and that it proposes explicit mechanisms for the emergence of mirroring - 
set it apart from other prominent accounts, such as the Schematic, Propositional, 
Associative, and Analogical Representational Systems (SPAARS) model (Power and 
Dalgleish, 1997) or Teasdale's Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (Barnard and Teasdale, 
1991). 
Hess, Philippot, and Blairy (1999) reviewed the literature on mirroring and its role in the 
communication of emotion. They conclude that there is strong evidence (e. g., Dimberg, 
1982; 1997; Lundqvist and Dimberg, 1995; Wallbott, 1991) that humans - both adults and 
infants - tend to mirror from a very early age. However, they also cite examples of counter- 
mirroring, i. e., expressing an alternative expression to that being presented. For example, 
Lanzetta and Englis (1989) found mirroring when participants believed they were 
collaborating but counter-mirroring when participants believed they were competing with 
one another. Hess and Blairy (2001) suggest that this implies mirroring may not be an 
automatic, reflex-like mechanism. However, it could be argued that the effect is simply 
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context dependent, remaining outside of conscious control nonetheless. A further 
alternative is that the initial, automatic response, when detected, can be suppressed at the 
conceptual level, at which point counter-mirroring is consciously adopted. 
Evidence for a link between empathy and mirroring 
In their review, Hess et al. (1999) found that the empirical support for the notion that 
mirroring facilitates emotion recognition is inconsistent. However, there remains the 
theoretical basis (from Lipps' model), linking mirroring to recognition through emotional 
contagion. In a study of their own (Hess and Blairy, 2001), they asked female participants 
to rate a short series of video clips of human faces expressing anger, sadness, disgust, and 
happiness. Participants were filmed during the task and a measure of emotional contagion 
was taken. Mirroring was measured using facial electromyography (EMG), with electrode 
placements chosen according to Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). Mirroring was evident for 
all emotion classes, while limited support was found for emotional contagion of happiness 
and sadness. They found no relations between mirroring and contagion, nor between 
mirroring and recognition. However, Wixon and Laird (1981) did find evidence that 
recognition varies with mirroring. In their study, participants were asked to pose facial pain, 
inhibit, or act naturally (i. e. without instruction), in response to seeing another person 
receiving a shock. It should be noted that the emotional expression being looked at in the 
Wixon and Laird paper - that of pain - was not investigated in the Hess and Blairy study, 
which may account for the apparent inconsistency. 
More recently a series of studies carried out by Marianne Sonnby-Borgström and her 
colleagues have demonstrated a link between empathy and mirroring (Sonnby-Borgström, 
2002; Sonnby-Borgström, Jönsson and Svensson, 2003). In these studies participants were 
exposed to pictures of angry or happy faces at different exposure times. A significant 
difference in mirroring between high- and low-empathy participants was found at all 
exposure times. High-empathy participants showed significant mirroring, while low- 
empathy participants did not and in fact tended to smile in response to angry faces - 
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another example of counter-mirroring effects. In terms of Leventhal's model, it may be 
hypothesised that the central motor programmes (the first level, an automatic, reflex-like 
process) in less empathic individuals are absent or impaired in some way; alternatively, the 
developmental experiences of these individuals may be such that their conditioned 
responses differ from those of more empathic individuals (the second level, an automatic 
memory system, of the perceptual-motor theory of emotion). While Leventhal hypothesised 
that the central motor programs are unlikely to change much across the lifespan, this second 
level develops according to conditioning (Leventhal, 1984). 
Measuring mirroring 
Facial EMG is generally used to measure facial responsiveness in mirroring studies (e. g., 
Hess and Blairy, 2001; Sonnby-Borgström, 2002; Sonnby-Borgström et al., 2003). 
However, EMG training can be prohibitively expensive and time-consuming. An 
alternative is the Facial Action Coding System (FACS), a formal method of rating faces 
through observation, developed by Ekman and colleagues (Ekman and Friesen, 1978). 
FACS classifies facial movements as a series of "Action Units" (AUs), of which 46 account 
for changes in facial expression and 12 describe changes in gaze direction and head 
orientation. However, FACS can only be used effectively following extensive training, 
rendering it impractical for use by most clinicians. Moreover, Sonnby-Borgström (2002) 
cites a paper by Tassinary and Cacioppo (1992) as a justification for using EMG rather than 
FACS, stating that the mirroring reactions were expected to be weak and too indiscernible 
to be classified by observation. However, the Tassinary and Caccioppo paper does not 
specifically make such a claim about mirroring experiments. Rather, it states that FACS 
was shown to be insufficiently sensitive to detect viewers' emotional responses to 
television adverts (Graham, 1980) and also to emotionally charged slides of natural scenes 
(Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, and Kim, 1986). There is no reference to mirroring studies, nor to 
the possibility that emotional expressions could be identified without having to resort to a 
system such as FACS, which has clearly defined lower thresholds. Such a method for 
measuring mirroring can be found in a task by Wallbott (1991). During the first part of the 
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task, a group of twenty students were asked to judge the emotions expressed in a series of 
pictures of faces, while being secretly filmed. They were invited back two weeks later and 
asked to view their own footage and guess which emotions they were decoding. Wallbott 
found a correspondence between the two sets of judgement data that was above chance, 
supporting the notion that mirroring had occurred. The obvious argument against the 
validity of these findings (pointed out by Wallbott himself) is that during the second part of 
the task participants could remember the order in which they made their original responses. 
Against this, Wallbott points out two factors that should have diverted attention and 
minimised recollection: participants did a number of studies during the two-week interval, 
and a large number of slides (65) were used. Nonetheless, a more convincing way to 
conduct the analysis would have been to randomise the presentation of response footage for 
the second part of the task. 
At present no study has looked at the facial responses of people who score highly on the 
PCL-R, or who have a personality disorder, to facial expressions of emotion. However, the 
work of Sonnby-Borgström and colleagues gives grounds to hypothesis that mirroring may 
occur to a lesser extent in this population, given both that they are known to score low on 
measures of empathy and that empathy has been found to correlate positively with 
mirroring. There is also evidence from one study that personality disorder is associated with 
reduced facial expressiveness in response to stimuli designed to induce either positive or 
negative emotional states (Rennberg, Heyn, Gebhard, and Bachmann, 2005). In the study, 
the stimuli were three-minute video clips taken from two films: a violent scene from "Cry 
Freedom" for the negative stimulus, and a slapstick sequence from "French Kiss" for the 
positive stimulus. 
In keeping with the Government's current priorities for research into DSPD, it would be 
beneficial to investigate facial responsiveness to facial expressions of emotion for the 
following two reasons: 
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1. It may allow inferences to be made about mechanisms that contribute to the 
development of DSPD (e. g., impaired central motor programs or abnormal conditioned 
responses, or a combination of the two, in accordance with Leventhal's model). 
2. Given that the treatment model currently being piloted at HMP Whitemoor includes 
emotional engagement as a core aspect, being able to incorporate a measure of 
mirroring into a test-retest battery may be useful as part of the treatment evaluation. 
Specifically, increases in facial mirroring in the DSPD offenders upon re-testing, 
relative to the control group, when taken in the context of a variety of other measures, 
could be interpreted as an indicator of treatment efficacy. In terms of Leventhal's 
model, this would constitute the development of new conditioned responses to the 
facial expressions of others. 
This study investigates the facial responses to facial expressions of emotion of prisoners 
currently involved with the DSPD Programme. An adaptation of the facial affect 
recognition paradigm, pioneered by Ekman and his colleagues, is employed for the task, as 
this method has been used effectively in a number of mirroring studies, (e. g., Wallbott, 
1991; Hess and Blairy, 2001). A brief history and critique of the paradigm follows, 
concluding this literature review. 
Facial affect recognition tasks 
There has been a debate for over 100 years in social psychology about whether facial 
expressions of emotion are universal or culture-specific, beginning with Charles Darwin's 
(1872) The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Ekman, 1999). Darwin 
believed that expressions of emotion may have originally served the function of enabling an 
organism to cope with the emotion and elements in the environment producing or 
maintaining the state. However, once these expressions were acquired they presented an 
additional, communicative function. Over the last 35 years the most frequently cited 
evidence in favour of the universality of facial expressions of emotion has come from the 
work of Paul Ekman and his colleagues (e. g., Ekman, Sorenson, and Friesen, 1969; Ekman 
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et al., 1987). The basic paradigm employed in much of this research involved presenting 
participants with a selection of photographs depicting prototypical facial expressions of 
emotion, and asking them to identify the particular emotion that was being displayed. In the 
earlier studies the expressions were posed by actors, but in a bid to provide greater 
ecological validity there have now been a number of studies using unposed expressions and 
even short video clips (Hess and Blairy, 2001), created by exposing participants to 
emotionally evocative stimuli and photographing or filming their responses. 
In a summary of the evidence from facial affect recognition tasks, Ekman (1999) cites 31 
groups from 21 literate countries who were shown photographs depicting happiness, anger, 
fear, sadness, disgust, and surprise. In every case, the majority in each group agreed about 
the photographs that showed happiness, sadness, and disgust. In 20 out of the 21 countries 
the majority agreed about the surprise faces, 19 out of 21 agreed about the fear faces, and 
18 out of 21 about the anger faces. Where there was disagreement, the most frequent 
response given by participants was the same across all the atypical countries. 
In recent years a number of studies have been conducted using the facial affect recognition 
paradigm with populations displaying psychopathic tendencies, or having particular 
personality disorders (e. g., Blair, Jones, Clark, and Smith, 1997; Blair, Colledge, Murray, 
and Mitchell, 2001; Blair, Mitchell, Peschardt, Colledge, Leonard, Shine, Murray, and 
Perret, 2004; and Kosson, Suchy, Mayer, and Libby, 2002). In the Blair et al. (1997) study 
psychopaths were found to display less autonomic activity than non-psychopaths while 
viewing sad or fearful faces but not while viewing more general (non-facial) threatening 
stimuli. In a study exposing participants to standardized emotional stimuli, again that were 
not facial expressions (Herpertz, Schwenger, Kunert, Lukas, Gretzer, Nutzmann, 
Schuerkens, and Sass, 2000) there were no differences in the psychophysiological reactions 
of patients with borderline personality disorder compared with patients with avoidant 
personality disorder and a non-clinical control group. 
Blair et al. (2001) investigated the sensitivity of children with psychopathic tendencies to 
facial expressions. They found selective impairments in the recognition of sad and fearful 
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expressions, a finding later repeated in adults (Blair et al., 2004). Blair (2001) has argued 
that sad expressions constitute a human submission response, and that correct perception of 
them is necessary to inhibit aggression through what he has termed a Violence Inhibition 
Mechanism. A contrasting finding was reported by Kosson et al. (2002), who compared the 
responses of 34 incarcerated psychopaths to those of a group of 33 non-psychopaths. They 
found that psychopaths were less accurate than non-psychopaths at classifying facial affect, 
with a specific deficit in classifying disgust. And finally, Mikhailova, Vladimirova, Iznak, 
Tsusulkovskaya, and Sushko (1996) found that individuals with schizotypal personality 
disorder showed reduced recognition of sad and happy faces relative to a non-clinical 
control group. These studies demonstrate both that the facial affect recognition paradigm 
can be used with populations displaying psychopathic tendencies or having personality 
disorder diagnoses, and that significant differences related to affect have been found 
between these populations and non-clinical groups. 
The classic facial affect recognition task has not gone without criticism, most notably from 
Russell (1994,1995), who has argued against the claim for universality of expressions. 
Russell points out that in groups of participants who are isolated from so-called Western 
culture, agreement that smiles indicate something positive is high, but agreement about 
other expressions is low and can even reduce to chance when methodological artefacts are 
removed. These artefacts include a forced-choice response format, within-subject design, 
and pre-selected photographs of posed facial expressions. When these are altered, Russell 
demonstrates that less supportive or non-supportive results occur, while combining them 
may help to shape the results. Russell does concede, however, that there is likely to be an 
association between facial expressions and emotions, albeit one loose enough to permit 
alternative accounts to universality of the magnitude endorsed by Ekman. The present study 
takes some of Russell's criticisms into account and attempts to address them, opting to use 
un-posed expressions and a combination of free- and forced- selection response format. 
Posed and un-posed facial expressions of emotion are similar, but there are detectable 
differences. For example, Smith, McHugo, and Lanzetta (1986) compared posed and 
imagery-induced expressions of happiness, sadness, and anger, and found that brow activity 
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present in the imagery-induced sad expressions was weak or absent in the posed ones. 
Forced selection, as opposed to forced choice, addresses Russell's criticism that the latter 
format portrays choices as mutually exclusive categories, by allowing participants to select 
more than one emotion for a single face (Russell, 1994). A completely free-selection 
response format addresses many of the limitations found when providing labels, including 
those outlined in the previous paragraph. However, these formats can be tedious for 
participants and analyzing open-ended participant responses can be time-consuming and 
ambiguous for experimenters. 
Russell and others have also raised the objection that cross-cultural differences in emotional 
labelling mean that emotion words validated in North America, as is the case with much 
emotional recognition research, may not correspond to the emotional constructs of other 
cultures (Haidt and Keltner, 1999; Russell and Yik, 1996). In the present study this concern 
will be disregarded as the vast majority, if not all of the participants are expected to have a 
Western cultural background. 
AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The evidence of reduced mirroring in individuals who scored low on a measure of empathy 
generates the hypothesis that prisoners on the DSPD Programme (with elevated PCL-R 
scores, associated with low empathy) mirror less than the normal population also. The 
further hypothesis was made that prisoners from the general prison population would show 
impaired mirroring to a lesser extent, reflecting PCL-R scores falling somewhere between 
the normal population and DSPD. This research was intended to pilot a procedure to 
measure mirroring in a prison setting, and to investigate the hypothesis that psychopathic 
individuals show impaired mirroring. The procedure could also be developed to evaluate 
the outcomes of treatments that target such deficits. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
The study was conducted at Her Majesty's Prison (HMP) Whitemoor and at the University 
of Leeds. At HMP Whitemoor, all 49 male prisoners on the two treatment spurs of D Wing 
(the DSPD Unit) were invited by letter to participate as the experimental group. Prisoners 
on the Programme had chosen to be involved with it, having agreed to an assessment that 
includes a PCL-R. They were accepted onto the Programme subject to receiving a PCL-R 
score greater than 30, or a PCL-R score greater than 25 and at least one personality disorder 
diagnosis other than antisocial personality disorder, or a PCL-R score greater than 20 and at 
least two personality disorder diagnoses other than antisocial personality disorder. 
Eleven prisoners from the DSPD Unit agreed to participate, with a mean age of 40.1 years 
(SD = 8.4, Range = 28.4 - 52.6). The mean number of personality disorder diagnoses was 
2.9 (SD 1.5). Diagnoses included examples of all but one (dependent personality disorder) 
of the ten personality disorders featured in DSM-IV-TR. Fig. 2 shows the frequencies of the 
different diagnoses, indicating that the antisocial and borderline subtypes were the most 
common. 
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Fig. 2: Frequency of different personality disorder diagnoses in the DSPD sample. 
The mean PCL-R score for ten of the eleven participants was 28.4 (SD = 3.6, Range = 24- 
33). One participant had a PCL-R score of 24, i. e., below the frequently used cutoff of 25. 
Because of the small group size, and taking into consideration the Harris et al. (1994) 
finding that a score as low as 19-20 can actually optimize the hit-rate for psychopathy, the 
data from this participant was not excluded from the analysis. The eleventh participant did 
not have a PCL-R score, but had received a Psychopathy Checklist - Screening Version 
(PCL-SV) score of 18. A PCL-SV score does not convert directly to a PCL-R score - 
unlike the PCL-R, it contains no criminal items - but scores correlate highly (r = 0.8) with 
the PCL-R; the authors suggest that a score of 18 or over is strongly indicative of 
psychopathy (Hart, Cox, and Hare, 1995). 
Two control groups were recruited for the study. The first was a group of nine 
predominantly Category A and B prisoners - none of whom were involved with the DSPD 
Programme - housed on A Wing at HMP Whitemoor. Letters of invitation were sent to all 
111 male prisoners on the wing, 41 of whom were accommodated on a voluntary drug 
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testing spur, while the remaining 71 prisoners were accommodated in regular cells. The 
initial response was low: only two prisoners agreed to participate. The author therefore 
visited the wing to provide prisoners with the opportunity to have any questions about the 
study answered. A major concern for some individuals centred on the need to be filmed 
during the task. Reassurances were given about the confidentiality of the footage, and that it 
would be destroyed at the end of the study. Seven additional prisoners agreed to participate, 
making a group total of nine participants. The mean age of this group was 38.9 years (SD = 
11.2, Range = 25.4 - 61.2). Personality disorder diagnoses and PCL-R scores were not 
available; however, participants were asked whether they were aware of having received 
any such diagnoses or a PCL-R score, with it being made clear that they were under no 
obligation to share this information. Only one participant stated that he had received a 
personality disorder diagnosis (antisocial). 
The third control group was recruited through advertisements on the University of Leeds 
Reporter website and posters put up around the University, and comprised a combination of 
male students and staff working at the University. In total ten people agreed to participate 
(mean age 31.1 years, SD 13.5). Informed consent was gained from all participants, and the 
study was approved by Northern and Yorkshire Multi-centre Research Ethics Committee 
(see Appendices A-H for ethical approval, letters of invitation, participant information 
sheets and informed consent forms). 
Apparatus and materials 
A Toshiba Satellite 4070CDT laptop, with 1024x768 pixel screen resolution was used to 
display the video clips using Windows Media Player. Clips were edited using Adobe 
Premiere. A video camera was needed in order to record participants' faces during the 
facial affect recognition task. It was not possible to use the same camera for the prison 
groups as for the University group: security clearance could not be obtained to take a 
camera into the prison, and it would have been similarly prohibited to return the prison's 
own camera, should it have been borrowed for use with the University group. A Panasonic 
M- 10 VHS camcorder was therefore used with the prison groups, and a Sony GR-DVL 150 
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digital video camera was used with the University group. Both were mounted on adjustable 
tripods. 
Stimuli 
Stimuli were taken from the Video Database of Moving Faces and People, created by Alice 
O'Toole and her colleagues at the University of Texas, Dallas (O'Toole, Harms, Snow, 
Hurst, Pappas, Ayyad, and Abdi, 2005). Participants in the database project were filmed as 
they viewed a ten-minute video, which contained scenes from various movies and 
television programs intended to elicit different emotions. Camera angle and lighting 
conditions were controlled throughout, allowing for consistency of presentation. The 
database includes five-second video clips of dynamic, unposed emotional expressions for 
284 participants that have not been formally normed by the authors. In total there are 2,150 
clips in the database. 
A subset of clips was sought from the database for this research, comprising five clips - at 
least two from each gender - and depicting each of the six basic emotions (Ekman, Friesen, 
and Ellsworth, 1972): anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise. An additional 
ten clips - five from each gender - were also sought to be used as neutral stimuli. The 
neutral clips were intended to serve as a counterbalance to the preponderance of negative 
emotions depicted by the other clips. Four of the clips for each emotion, plus eight of the 
neutral clips, were to be used in the main task, while the remaining ten clips would be used 
in a practice task to familiarise participants with the procedure. 
Within the constraints of this research it was deemed impractical to have the database rated 
in its entirety by multiple raters. The author therefore viewed all 2,150 clips in order to 
filter and discard those that were unlikely to be of use, either because they clearly showed 
blends of emotions or because they were particularly weak examples of specific emotions. 
Following this initial exercise, a number of useable clips were found for each of the 
emotions: anger (38 clips), disgust (43 clips), fear (44 clips), sadness (30 clips), and 
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surprise (43 clips). There were many more examples of happiness (95 clips) and neutral 
(406 clips). The mean number of clips for the other five emotions (Mean - 40) was 
therefore used to determine the number of happiness and neutral clips selected for rating, 
i. e., 40 happiness clips were randomly selected and, in order to reflect the balance of clips 
that were sought for the main task, 80 (twice as many) neutral clips were selected. This 
resulted in 322 clips to be used in the rating task. 
During the initial filtering of the clips it was noted that there were large variations in the 
duration of expressions. Some expressions lasted for most of the full 5 seconds, while 
others were much shorter, sometimes lasting only a fraction of a second. In order to balance 
the duration of expression across clips - thereby ensuring that this variable was held 
constant for each emotional class - it was decided at this stage to edit the clips so that they 
would freeze and hold at full expression. This was a difficult decision, as editing the clips 
in this way was clearly at the expense of a degree of ecological validity; however, it was 
reasoned that the resulting set of clips would nonetheless constitute spontaneous 
expressions of emotion. Moreover, pausing clips at full expression plausibly creates stimuli 
that are no more artificial than the still images used in the vast majority of emotion 
recognition studies. 
Adobe Premiere was used to edit the clips. As far as was possible, clips were edited so that 
the onset of expression commenced 12 image frames, or approximately 0.5 seconds, after 
the start of the clip (in a small minority of clips the onset of expression commenced slightly 
earlier than this). The clips were then set to pause at the peak of the expression and hold as 
a still image until the end of the 5-second duration. These start and end points were 
ascertained by careful frame-by-frame viewing of the clips, through which it was possible 
to locate the points at which groups of facial muscles would first begin to move from one 
arrangement and second settle into another. The mean number of frames taken for a face to 
change from starting expression to final expression was 18.38 (SD = 9.62). This figure was 
used to determine the number of frames into each clip that the neutral clips were then 
paused in order to balance them with the rest of the set, i. e. the neutral clips were edited to 
pause 30 (12 plus 18) frames, or 1.2 seconds, after the start of the clip. 
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The full set of 322 edited clips was viewed and rated independently by seven people, 
recruited from among the author's peers and colleagues (four males and three females; 
mean age 27.1 years, SD = 5.9). Raters were asked to label the emotion or emotions that 
they perceived in each clip, from a selection of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, 
surprise, neutral, and other (to be specified). Each response was rated on a seven-point 
scale from one (weak) to seven (strong) (see Appendix I for instructions). Clips were 
presented on a laptop in a random order using Windows Media Player. Raters were able to 
pause the presentation after each clip was presented while they considered their answer, 
before starting it again. The instructions were placed alongside the computer to act as a 
reminder of the labelling options, and answers were given verbally and recorded by the 
author. This response method was employed in order to enable the volunteer raters to 
progress more quickly through the clips - which nonetheless took up to 90 minutes to rate - 
as they were free to view the next clip while the author recorded their previous response. 
The initial criterion applied when selecting clips for the main task was agreement between 
at least five of the seven raters (71 per cent) on the presence of a particular emotion. This 
procedure provided a sufficient number of clips depicting anger, disgust, happiness, 
surprised, neutral and sadness (female only). There were no male sadness clips, nor fear 
clips of either gender that met this criterion. It was necessary therefore to use clips with 
lower rates of agreement for these expressions (4 for the female fear and male sadness 
expressions and 3 for the male fear expressions; see Table 1). A further complication was 
presented with fear, as all of the clips meeting this criterion were actually more likely to be 
rated as surprise clips, either in combination with fear or another emotion, or as purely 
surprise. The clips selected for this emotion were therefore labelled as blends of fear and 
surprise. 
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Minimum rater agreement criterion 
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Emotion Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Anger 15 25 7 10 5* 5* 
Disgust 19 46 14 39 12* 32* 
Fear/surprise 5* 17 0 6* 0 0 
Happiness 24 24 20 21 20* 20* 
Sadness 5 38 2* 27 0 12* 
Surprise 21 68 20 59 18* 55* 
Neutral 35 39 32 32 24* 15* 
Table 1: Number of clips in each emotion class depicting each gender, with different minimum rater 
agreement criteria applied. *Criterion. 
From the available clips (indicated with an asterisk in Table 1), the two male and two 
female clips with the highest mean strength rating within each emotion class were selected 
for use in the main task, while the third highest strength rating clips were selected for use in 
the practice clips (three male and three female clips). A random selection of five male and 
five female clips labelled neutral were also selected. The resulting stimulus set is 
summarized in Table 2, indicating mean strength ratings and standard deviations as 
calculated using only the scores of raters who actually labelled the emotion. As is clear 
from the table, there is variability across emotions. The male sadness clips received 
particularly weak ratings, while the female disgust clips were rated much more strongly. It 
would have been possible to balance this out somewhat by selecting weaker clips from 
those emotions for which more clips were available, thereby weakening the stimulus set 
overall; however, it was reasoned that it would be better to use the strongest clips available 
for each emotion, with the hypothesis that these clips were more likely to lead to mirroring 
by participants during the main task. Consequently, in the analysis for the main task, each 
emotional class was analysed separately; for example, mirroring scores are calculated for 
anger, disgust, fear/surprise, etc., but no overall mirroring score is given. 
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Emotion Number of clips 
Mean strength rating (SD) 
Male Female 
Anger 5 3.4 (0.4) 3.6 (0.28) 
Disgust 5 3.85 (0.02) 6.33 (0.22) 
Fear/ 4.54 (0.66)/ 3.77 (0.41)/ 
Surprise 5 4.08 (0.12) 3.25 (0.57) 
Happiness 5 4.67 (0.3) 5.22 (0.3) 
Sadness 5 2.38 (0.53) 4.89 (0.6) 
Surprise 5 4.44 (1.29) 4.97 (0.66) 
Neutral 10 N/A N/A 
Table 2: Number of clips selected for main task, including practice clips. 
Design 
The main task involved a3 (Group: DSPD, prison control, University control) x7 
(Emotional expression: anger, disgust, fear/surprise, happiness, sadness, surprise, neutral) 
mixed design. Group was a between-participant variable and emotional class was a within- 
participant variable. 
Procedure 
A facial affect recognition task was carried out in rooms on the two wings at HMP 
Whitemoor and in a room at the University of Leeds. The laptop was set up on a table to 
run the task, and Participant Information Sheets, Task Instructions and response booklets 
were placed next to the laptop. A video camera was mounted on a tripod in the corner of 
the room and left on standby. This was used to film participants' faces during the task, to be 
rated by independent raters at a later date. Participants were informed that they were to be 
filmed, and that the recordings would be viewed by independent raters. 
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Efforts were made to ensure the different environments were as similar as possible, 
particularly with respect to lighting, by always placing the table before a window and 
directly beneath a strip light on the ceiling. Fig. 1 indicates the features of the rooms that 
were held constant, with the centimetre measurements referring to the distance from one 
corner of the table to the lens of the camera - which was also positioned at a height of 
86cm. There was some small variation between participants on this measure, as the camera 
had to be slightly repositioned to accommodate the different heights and seating postures of 
participants. 
Response 
booklet 
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Fig. 3: Illustration of the features of the rooms that were held constant across settings. 
Participants were asked to watch each clip all the way through, and to wait for it to 
disappear before indicating their response from a selection of anger, disgust, fear, 
happiness, sadness, surprise, neutral and other. If other was selected, participants were 
also asked to write the word they felt best described the emotion in the clip. Each response 
was rated on a seven-point scale from one (weak) to seven (strong), and participants were 
able to assign more than one emotion to each clip (see Appendix J for instructions). Prior to 
commencing the practice trials they were shown an example of the countdown screen that 
would appear between clips, and that also displayed the number of the clip that had just 
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been shown (in order to ensure that the correct answer was filled in on the response 
booklet). 
For the practice task the eight selected clips were presented in a random order. The task 
served both to familiarize participants with the procedure and to enable the author to start 
and position the video camera correctly. The participant was informed of the moment the 
camera was switched on, which was done immediately before presentation of the practice 
clips. It also provided a period of time for participants to become accustomed to the 
presence of the camera. Immediately following this participants were given the opportunity 
to have any remaining questions answered before completing the main task, which 
consisted of 64 clips (each of the 32 main task clips presented twice), shown in a random 
order, with an opportunity for a short break halfway through. 
During the practice task the time between clips gradually reduced, from an initial 24 
seconds for the first two clips, to 19 seconds for the third and fourth clips and finally to 14 
seconds for the remaining four clips. Each clip was preceded by two audio beeps, providing 
a two-second count-in to the clip. The audio tones were to be used later for editing the 
footage of participants' facial responses during the task, but served also as a prompt to 
participants that a clip was about to appear on-screen. The practice task took approximately 
four minutes to complete and the main task lasted approximately 20 minutes. 
Rating 
The final task prior to analysis was to take a measure of participants' facial responses 
during the main task. This was done by showing the video footage - comprising a portrait 
view of each participant as they completed the task - to two independent raters, who were 
asked to label the emotions being expressed by participants. One rater was a trainee 
forensic psychologist and the other was a psychologist in clinical training. Neither of the 
two raters worked directly with either of the prisoner groups. However, one of the raters - 
who held an honorary contract with the prison - had conducted some research on D Wing 
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that included brief meetings with some of the prisoners. Neither rater had any special 
training in the decoding of facial expressions, as was the case in the successful Wallbott 
(1991) study. 
Before the rating was conducted, the footage was segmented and randomly ordered into 
five sets of clips. Each set was intended to be used in a task that could be completed by a 
rater in a single sitting. In order to achieve this, the footage was first converted to digital 
video (DV) files. Subsequently, it was segmented using Adobe Premiere to produce 64, 
five-second clips for each participant (or 1 920 clips in total). These clips corresponded to 
the periods during which stimuli were being viewed during the main task (the audio beeps 
were used to locate the periods when participants were viewing stimuli). 
It was impractical to have all 1 920 clips rated in a single sitting, as this would take around 
eight hours. It was also assumed that raters would learn to read the faces of individual 
participants over a number of trials. It was therefore preferable for all of the clips from any 
one participant to be encountered within a single rating session, and for blocks of clips to 
have a duration that would not induce fatigue in the raters. In order to achieve this, clips 
from subgroups of six participants (two selected at random from each group) were 
compiled to form five blocks, each one taking approximately 90 minutes to rate. Because 
the original group numbers were not equal, for the fifth and final set it was necessary to 
include three participants from the DSPD group, one from the prison control group, and 
two from the University group. In summary, five blocks were created, with each one 
comprising the 64 main task clips for six participants, totalling 384 clips per block. The 
clips within each block were presented in a (different) random order to each rater. 
The rating task was similar in form to the familiar facial affect recognition paradigm. It 
differed primarily in the information that was given about the nature of the clips: raters 
were informed that the people in the clips had themselves been viewing facial expressions 
of emotion that included anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise, and neutral. 
They were also advised that sometimes people mirror the facial expressions that they see. 
They were then asked to guess the emotion that was being viewed for each clip. Raters 
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selected only one emotion for each clip, from a selection of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness, surprise, and neutral (see Appendix K for instructions). It had been noted by the 
author at the editing stage that the vast majority of the facial responses of participants 
during the task were of very low intensity. Raters were therefore not asked to provide a 
strength score. Clips were presented to the raters one set at a time, using Windows Media 
Player. A screen was displayed after each clip for 20 seconds, displaying the number of the 
clip that had just been shown. Raters were able to skip forward to the next clip once they 
had marked their answer in the response booklet, and short breaks could be taken after 
every 64 clips. Each of the five sets took approximately 90 minutes to complete. 
RESULTS 
Main analysis 
Interrater reliability 
Unweighted Cohen's kappa scores for interrater reliability were low (mean K=0.28, SD = 
0.15, Range = 0.12 - 0.6). Kappas for each set of clips corresponding to a single emotional 
class in the stimulus set are summarised in Table 3, which indicates low mean values for all 
classes (Range = 0.19 - 0.38). The data from each rater were therefore analysed separately, 
rather than only trials on which both raters agreed being considered. 
Anger Disgust Fear Happiness Sadness Surprise Neutral 
Mean K 0.27 0.36 0.38 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.19 
SD 0.1 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.1 0.14 0.18 
Range 0.12- 0.23- 0.20- 0.05- 0.11- 0.16- -0.12- 
0.42 0.56 0.6 0.46 0.43 0.6 0.51 
Table 3: Mean Cohen's kappa scores for each emotional class (based on the stimulus set 
classifications). 
The low kappas may in part be explained by a low prevalence of observable mirroring: this 
suggestion is supported by the fact that the majority of clips were labelled neutral in the 
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rating task (63.4% of clips by Rater 1 and 78.1 % of clips by Rater 2; see Table 4). Such a 
result produces an asymmetrical imbalance in the marginal totals of the kappa table - in 
this case, a7x7 table - which can generate low values for x despite a higher level of 
agreement (Kraemer, 1979). Simple agreement was 67%, much higher than the kappas but 
low nonetheless. 
Rater Anger Disgust Fear Happiness Sadness Surprise Neutral 
1 6.4 2.6 2.6 9.9 7.6 7.6 63.4 
2 2.9 4.0 1.7 6.7 2.8 3.9 78.1 
Table 4: Percentage of clips mapped onto each emotional class. 
Mirroring 
Raw mirroring scores 
In order to measure the extent to which mirroring occurred, rater responses were compared 
with the "true" identity of the clip that was being viewed (as determined by the original 
rating of the stimulus set). The percentage of trials (for each emotional class of stimuli, i. e. 
anger, disgust, fear/surprise, happiness, sadness, and surprise) on which there was a match 
between rater response and clip identity provided raw mirroring scores for each participant 
for each emotional class. A response to clips corresponding to fear/surprise clips was 
classed as mirroring if the rater entered either fear or surprise. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D (normality) tests and Levene's homogeneity of variance tests were 
carried out on the raw mirroring scores with group as a between-subjects factor. These are 
summarised in Tables 5 and 6. All mirroring variables were non-normal, a fact that 
remained unchanged when the data were transformed using either logarithmic or square 
root transformations. Furthermore, mirroring of happiness as scored by Rater 1, plus 
mirroring of both anger and surprise as scored by Rater 2, lacked homogeneity of variance. 
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Mirroring Kolmogorov-Smirnov Levene 
variable Group D N Sig. F Sig. 
Anger DSPD 0.27 11 0.03 2.89 0.07 
Prison control 0.41 9 0.00 
University control 0.41 10 0.00 
Disgust DSPD 0.41 11 0.00 
Prison control 0.52 9 0.00 
University control 0.48 10 0.00 
Fear/ DSPD 0.23 11 0.10 
surprise Prison control 0.23 9 0.20 
University control 0.36 10 0.00 
Happiness DSPD 0.34 11 0.00 
Prison control 0.32 9 0.01 
University control 0.23 10 0.15 
Sadness DSPD 0.31 11 0.01 
Prison control 0.28 9 0.04 
University control 0.31 10 0.01 
1.18 0.32 
0.20 0.82 
7.71 0.00 
0.43 0.66 
Surprise DSPD 0.26 11 0.04 2.46 0.10 
Prison control 0.26 9 0.09 
University control 0.33 10 0.00 
Table 5: K-S D-scores and Levene's test statistics for raw mirroring as scored by Rater 1. For the 
Levene's tests, k-1=2 and N-k= 27 degrees of freedom. 
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Mirroring 
variable Group 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
DN Sig. 
Levene 
F Sig. 
Anger DSPD 0.39 11 0.00 6.04 0.01 
Prison control 0.40 9 0.00 
University control 0.48 10 0.00 
Disgust DSPD 0.34 11 0.00 0.81 0.46 
Prison control 0.52 9 0.00 
University control 0.32 10 0.00 
Fear/ DSPD 0.28 11 0.01 1.56 0.23 
surprise Prison control 0.31 9 0.02 
University control 0.36 10 0.00 
Happiness DSPD 0.43 11 0.00 0.21 0.81 
Prison control 0.43 9 0.00 
University control 0.37 10 0.00 
Sadness DSPD 0.48 11 0.00 1.15 0.30 
Prison control* - - --- 
University control 0.40 10 0.00 
Surprise DSPD 0.35 11 0.00 4.24 0.02 
Prison control 0.47 9 0.00 
University control 0.48 10 0.00 
Table 6: K-S D-scores and Levene's test statistics for raw mirroring as scored by Rater 2. For the 
Levene's tests, k-1=2 and N-k= 27 degrees of freedom. *There was no mirroring of sadness in 
the prison control group; this variable was therefore constant and was excluded from these tests. 
Descriptive statistics for raw mirroring data are summarised in Tables 7 (Rater 1) and 8 
(Rater 2). These show that the majority of variables were positively skewed and leptokurtic. 
As the data were not normally distributed, median scores are shown instead of means as a 
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more meaningful measure of central tendency. These medians were generally low, with a 
range of 0- 25% (Rater 1), and 0- 12.5% (Rater 2). 
Mirroring 
variable Group Skewness Kurtosis Median Min. Max. 
Anger DSPD 1.24 0.87 12.50 0 63 
Prison control 0.86 -1.71 0.00 0 13 
University control 1.64 1.06 0.00 0 50 
Disgust DSPD 2.41 6.06 0.00 0 38 
Prison control 3.00 9.00 0.00 0 50 
University control 1.78 1.41 0.00 0 13 
Fear/ DSPD 1.01 1.01 12.50 0 63 
surprise Prison control 0.56 0.19 25.00 0 50 
University control 1.05 -0.39 0.00 0 38 
Happiness DSPD 0.65 -1.55 0.00 0 25 
Prison control 2.27 5.66 0.00 0 50 
University control 0.59 -1.20 25.00 0 88 
Sadness DSPD 1.30 0.60 0.00 0 50 
Prison control 2.11 4.71 0.00 0 63 
University control 0.47 -1.81 6.25 0 25 
Surprise DSPD 1.81 3.91 12.50 0 75 
Prison control 0.50 -0.01 12.50 0 38 
University control 0.00 -2.57 6.25 0 13 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for raw mirroring variables as scored by Rater 1. 
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Mirroring 
variable Group Skewness Kurtosis Median Min. Max. 
Anger DSPD 0.91 -1.27 0.00 0 25 
Prison control 1.19 -0.45 0.00 0 25 
University control 1.78 1.41 0.00 0 13 
Disgust DSPD 2.79 8.33 0.00 0 63 
Prison control 3.00 9.00 0.00 0 38 
University control 0.13 0.18 12.50 0 25 
Fear/ DSPD 0.34 -1.70 12.50 0 38 
surprise Prison control 2.06 4.68 12.50 0 63 
University control 1.18 0.57 0.00 0 25 
Happiness DSPD 1.83 2.45 0.00 0 38 
Prison control 2.80 7.97 0.00 0 63 
University control 2.45 6.78 12.50 0 75 
Sadness DSPD 2.42 5.51 0.00 0 25 
Prison control* - - 0.00 0 0 
University control 2.27 5.36 0.00 0 38 
Surprise DSPD 2.05 4.19 0.00 0 50 
Prison control 1.62 0.73 0.00 0 13 
University control 1.78 1.41 0.00 0 13 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics for raw mirroring variables as scored by Rater 2. *There was no 
mirroring of sadness in the prison control group; values for skewness and kurtosis are therefore not 
given. 
Parametric tests are robust to mild violations of core assumptions (e. g., Howell, 1999); 
however, because more than one assumption was violated on a number of the mirroring 
variables, statistical tests were applied conservatively throughout, i. e. non-parametric tests 
were used. Kruskal-Wallis H tests were carried out, testing for differences on mirroring 
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scores between groups. None of the group differences reached statistical significance at the 
5% level. However, in order to investigate the possibility of significant pairwise 
differences, a more liberal level of 15% was applied. For five variables, p<0.15 (see Table 
9). Pairwise analyses were carried out on these (Mann-Whitney U tests), in order to 
determine whether pairs of groups differed significantly in mirroring. For these tests, the 
more robust 5% level was used to determine significant group differences (see Table 10). 
Rater 1 Rater 2 
Mirroring variable Group H Sig. H Sig. 
Anger DSPD 4.82 0.09* 1.23 0.54 
Prison control 
University control 
Disgust DSPD 0.60 0.83 4.95 0.08* 
Prison control 
University control 
Fear/ DSPD 2.65 0.27 1.55 0.47 
surprise Prison control 
University control 
Happiness DSPD 3.78 0.15* 4.07 0.13* 
Prison control 
University control 
Sadness DSPD 0.02 0.99 2.97 0.23 
Prison control 
University control 
Surprise DSPD 3.97 0.15* 1.25 0.57 
Prison control 
University control 
Table 9: Results of Kruskal-Wallis H tests (d. f. = 2) carried out on raw mirroring, shown 
separately for Rater 1 and Rater 2. *p < 0.15. 
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Rater 
Mirroring 
variable Groups 
Mann-Whitney 
U Sig. r 
1 Anger DSPD - Prison controls 24.00 0.03** -0.38 
DSPD - University controls 34.50 0.07 -0.28 
Prison controls - University controls 43.50 0.44 -0.03 
1 Happiness DSPD - Prison controls 47.00 0.43 -0.04 
DSPD - University controls 32.00 0.05* -0.31 
Prison controls - University controls 26.50 0.06 -0.29 
1 Surprise DSPD - Prison controls 48.50 0.49 -0.01 
DSPD - University controls 32.50 0.06 -0.31 
Prison controls - University controls 25.00 0.06 -0.32 
2 Disgust DSPD - Prison controls 38.00 0.18 -0.21 
DSPD - University controls 38.50 0.12 -0.23 
Prison controls - University controls 22.00 0.01 * -0.39 
2 Happiness DSPD - Prison controls 47.50 0.49 -0.04 
DSPD - University controls 35.00 0.07 -0.28 
Prison controls - University controls 25.00 0.04* -0.33 
Table 10: Results of Mann-Whitney U tests carried out on differences in raw mirroring scores 
between pairs of groups. 1-tailed significance levels are reported. *p < 0.05. **p < 0.05; however, 
this difference is in the opposite direction to that predicted and is therefore non-significant. 
Taking into account the status of this research as a pilot study, and in the interests of 
identifying potentially important group differences that could be explored in future 
research, in addition to the liberal p-values, familywise corrections (e. g., the Bonferroni 
procedure) were not applied throughout the analysis. Those differences that approached 
significance at the initial level of analysis were therefore investigated further with pairwise 
tests. 
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One-tailed significance levels are reported, in accordance with the hypothesis that mirroring 
will be greatest in the university control group and lowest in the DSPD group. Effect sizes 
were calculated for all variables, using Pearson's correlation coefficient r. For mirroring of 
happiness as scored by Rater 1, university controls (Mdn = 25) were found to mirror more 
than participants in the DSPD group (Mdn = 0), with a medium effect size (U = 32, p= 
0.048, r= -0.31). For mirroring of both disgust and happiness as scored by Rater 2, 
university controls (Mdn = 12.5 for each variable) were found to mirror significantly more 
than prison controls (Mdn =0 for each variable), with medium effect sizes (U = 22, p= 
0.01, r= -0.39; U= 25, p=0.04, r= -0.33, respectively). Mirroring of anger as scored by 
Rater 1 was higher in the DSPD group (Mdn = 12.5) than in the prison controls (Mdn = 0), 
with a medium effect size (U= 24, p=0.03, r= -0.38); however, this difference was not in 
the predicted direction and therefore precludes rejection of the null hypothesis for mirroring 
of anger. 
Controlling for baseline facial expressions 
The above method generated raw scores for mirroring that did not take into account 
potential individual or group differences in participants' baseline facial expressions. It was 
important to control for this potential source of variance because, for example, it could be 
argued that any group differences in the mirroring of anger expressions are a reflection of 
the natural tendency of members of the DSPD group to appear more angry than the other 
groups (irrespective of the particular stimuli they are viewing). There is indirect empirical 
evidence for this suggestion in reports of elevated trait anger levels in offender populations 
and forensic patients (Chemtob, Novaco, Hamada, and Gross, 1997; Watt and Howells, 
1999). 
Rater responses for clips when participants were viewing neutral stimuli were used to 
establish base rates of expressions. It was assumed that footage of participants viewing 
neutral clips would give an indication of their neutral expression. Taking anger as an 
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example, for each participant the percentage of clips corresponding to neutral stimuli that a 
rater labelled anger was subtracted from that participant's raw mirroring score for anger. 
The same procedure was applied to the remaining five emotional classes. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D tests and Levene's tests were again carried out to measure 
normality and homogeneity of variance respectively, with composite mirroring scores as 
dependent variables and group as a between-participants factor. Tables 11 and 12 show K-S 
and Levene statistics for Rater 1 and Rater 2 respectively. Descriptive data are shown in 
Tables 13 and 14. As was the case with raw mirroring scores, no variables met both 
normality and homogeneity of variance assumptions for parametric testing, with a tendency 
to be positively skewed and leptokurtic. Group medians were lower than for raw mirroring, 
as would be expected following a subtraction from participants' scores, falling within the 
range 0- 15.63% (Rater 1) and 0-9.38% (Rater 2). 
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Composite 
mirroring 
variable 
Anger 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Levene 
Group D N Sig. 
DSPD 0.29 11 0.01 
Prison control 0.34 9 0.00 
University control 0.46 10 0.00 
F Sig. 
1.11 0.35 
Disgust DSPD 0.37 11 0.00 
Prison control 0.48 9 0.00 
University control 0.52 10 0.00 
Fear/ DSPD 0.21 11 0.17 
surprise Prison control 0.19 9 0.20 
University control 0.31 10 0.01 
Happiness DSPD 0.23 11 0.11 
Prison control 0.21 9 0.20 
University control 0.23 10 0.15 
Sadness DSPD 0.31 11 0.01 
Prison control 0.24 9 0.16 
University control 0.27 10 0.03 
1.89 0.17 
0.34 0.72 
6.11 0.01 
0.80 0.46 
Surprise DSPD 0.31 11 0.00 2.97 0.07 
Prison control 0.23 9 0.20 
University control 0.34 10 0.00 
Table 11: K-S D-scores and Levene's homogeneity test statistics for composite mirroring as scored 
by Rater 1. For the Levene's tests, k-1=2 and N- k= 27 degrees of freedom. 
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Composite Kolmogorov-Smirnov Levene 
mirroring 
variable Group D N Sig. F Sig. 
Anger DSPD 0.36 11 0.00 5.08 0.01 
Prison control 0.37 9 0.00 
University control 0.35 10 0.00 
Disgust DSPD 0.24 11 0.08 
Prison control 0.52 9 0.00 
University control 0.27 10 0.05 
Fear/ DSPD 0.17 11 0.20 
Surprise Prison control 0.26 9 0.07 
University control 0.43 10 0.00 
Happiness DSPD 0.41 11 0.00 
Prison control 0.40 9 0.00 
University control 0.33 10 0.00 
Sadness DSPD 0.48 11 0.00 
Prison control 0.52 9 0.00 
University control 0.43 10 0.00 
2.26 0.12 
2.88 0.07 
0.15 0.86 
8.29 0.00 
Surprise DSPD 0.26 11 0.04 4.67 0.02 
Prison control 0.33 9 0.01 
University control 0.40 10 0.00 
Table 12: K-S D-scores and Levene's homogeneity test statistics for composite mirroring as scored 
by Rater 2. For the Levene's tests, k-1=2 and N- k= 27 degrees of freedom. 
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Composite 
minoring 
variable Group Skewness Kurtosis Median Min. Max. 
Anger DSPD 1.74 4.43 12.50 -6.25 50.00 
Prison control 0.66 -0.42 0.00 -6.25 12.50 
University control 2.04 3.55 0.00 -6.25 43.75 
Disgust DSPD 1.80 4.44 0.00 -12.50 37.50 
Prison control 2.55 7.45 0.00 -12.50 43.75 
University control 3.16 10.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 
Fear/ DSPD 1.39 2.09 6.25 -6.25 50.00 
surprise Prison control 0.38 -0.56 12.50 -12.50 43.75 
University control 1.45 1.57 0.00 -12.50 37.50 
Happiness DSPD -0.08 0.00 0.00 -18.75 25.00 
Prison control 1.03 1.84 0.00 -18.75 31.25 
University control 0.88 -0.49 15.63 -6.25 87.50 
Sadness DSPD 1.07 0.27 0.00 -12.50 31.25 
Prison control -0.35 0.93 0.00 -18.75 25.00 
University control 1.15 0.82 3.13 -6.25 25.00 
Surprise DSPD 1.98 3.88 6.25 -6.25 68.75 
Prison control 1.51 2.33 6.25 0.00 37.50 
University control 0.81 1.24 0.00 -6.25 12.50 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics for composite mirroring variables as scored by Rater 1. 
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Composite 
mirroring 
variable Group Skewness Kurtosis Median Min. Max. 
Anger DSPD 0.78 -0.99 0.00 -6.25 25.00 
Prison control 1.02 -0.29 0.00 -6.25 25.00 
University control 1.02 1.83 0.00 -6.25 12.50 
Disgust DSPD 1.82 4.88 0.00 -18.75 50.00 
Prison control 3.00 9.00 0.00 0.00 18.75 
University control 1.33 2.21 6.25 0.00 25.00 
Fear/ DSPD 0.59 -0.85 6.25 -12.50 37.50 
surprise Prison control 1.82 3.64 6.25 -6.25 56.25 
University control 1.59 2.13 0.00 -6.25 18.75 
Happiness DSPD 1.71 2.16 0.00 -6.25 37.50 
Prison control 2.39 6.06 0.00 -6.25 43.75 
University control 2.68 7.80 9.38 0.00 75.00 
Sadness DSPD 2.42 5.51 0.00 0.00 12.50 
Prison control -3.00 9.00 0.00 -6.25 0.00 
University control 1.26 -0.07 0.00 0.00 18.75 
Surprise DSPD 1.48 2.83 0.00 -18.75 50.00 
Prison control 0.94 1.35 0.00 -6.25 12.50 
University control 0.00 4.50 0.00 -12.50 12.50 
Table 14: Descriptive statistics for composite mirroring variables as scored by Rater 2. 
Kruskal-Wallis H tests were carried out, comparing composite mirroring scores between 
groups. None of the group differences reached significance at the 5% level. The more 
liberal level of 15% was therefore applied again in order to investigate the possibility that 
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there were significant pairwise differences. For four emotions, differences were significant 
at the 15% level (see Table 15). 
Composite Rater 1 Rater 2 
mirroring variable Group H Sig. H Sig. 
Anger DSPD 
Prison control 
University control 
Disgust DSPD 
Prison control 
University control 
Fear/ DSPD 
surprise Prison control 
University control 
Happiness DSPD 
Prison control 
University control 
Sadness DSPD 
Prison control 
University control 
Surprise DSPD 
Prison control 
University control 
2.86 0.25 1.64 0.45 
0.58 0.85 4.00 0.14* 
1.92 0.39 1.13 0.58 
4.10 0.13* 4.20 0.12* 
1.15 0.57 4.52 0.12* 
2.28 0.33 0.23 0.89 
Table 15: Results of Kruskal-Wallis H tests (d. f= 2) carried out on composite mirroring, shown 
separately for Rater 1 and Rater 2. *p < 0.15. 
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Pairwise analyses were carried out on those variables for which p<0.15 (Mann-Whitney U 
tests), in order to determine whether pairs of groups differed significantly in composite 
mirroring. For these tests, the more robust 5% level was used to determine significant 
group effects (see Table 16). For composite mirroring of happiness as scored by Rater 1, 
university controls (Mdn = 15.63) were found to mirror more than prison controls (Mdn = 
0), with a medium effect size (U = 22.5, p=0.03, r= -0.34). For Rater 2, university 
controls mirrored significantly more happiness (Mdn = 9.38) and disgust (Mdn = 6.25) clips 
than prison controls (Mdn =0 for each variable), with medium effect sizes (U = 23, p= 
0.03, r= -0.34; U=21, p=0.01, r=-0.4). 
Mirroring Mann-Whitney 
Rater variable Groups U Sig. r 
1 Happiness DSPD - Prison controls 35.50 0.14 -0.20 
DSPD - University controls 38.00 0.11 -0.23 
Prison controls - University controls 22.50 0.03* -0.34 
2 Disgust DSPD - Prison controls 49.00 0.50 -0.01 
DSPD - University controls 37.00 0.10 -0.24 
Prison controls - University controls 21.00 0.01 * -0.40 
2 Happiness DSPD - Prison controls 43.00 0.33 -0.10 
DSPD - University controls 35.00 0.07 -0.27 
Prison controls - University controls 23.00 0.03* -0.34 
2 Sadness DSPD - Prison controls 36.00 0.14 -0.30 
DSPD - University controls 46.50 0.22 -0.15 
Prison controls - University controls 28.00 0.07 -0.36 
Table 16: Results of Mann-Whitney U tests carried out on differences in composite mirroring scores 
between pairs of groups. One-tailed significance levels are reported. *p < 0.05. 
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Supplementary analyses 
Recognition 
Recoding responses 
Before assessing rates of recognition of the stimuli among participants, the response data 
were recoded in order to overcome the difficulties inherent in analysing (partially) open- 
ended responses. There were two stages to this procedure: first, responses that participants 
entered in the other category were reclassified either as one of the six basic emotions (used 
to define the stimulus set), or as neutral. In the second stage, multiple responses (i. e., 
emotional classes) entered on a single trial were collapsed into one, dominant response. 
The affective lexicon developed by Andrew Ortony and colleagues (Ortony, Clore, and 
Foss, 1987; Clore, Foss, and Ortony, 1987) was used to facilitate the first stage. This 
lexicon comprises 585 words taken from the literature on emotion. In the first of two 
papers, the researchers report a taxonomy of these words (Ortony, Clore, and Foss, 1987), 
derived using componential analysis (Goodenough, 1956). The rationally (as opposed to 
empirically) derived taxonomy is shown in Fig. 10. In the diagram, psychological 
conditions are shown in ellipses, while rectangles enclose the features that differentiate 
them. The following eight categories are contained in the taxonomy, collapsed into four 
broad classes (illustrated in the diagram by the four rectangles with thick borders): 
" Subjective Evaluations and Objective Descriptions (External Conditions class) 
" Physical and Bodily States (Physical and Bodily States class) 
" Affective States, Affective-Behavioural Conditions, Affective-Cognitive Conditions 
(Affective Conditions class) 
" Behavioural-Cognitive Conditions and Cognitive Conditions (Cognitive Conditions 
class) 
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INTERNAL 
NONMENTAL 
PHYSICAL & 
BODILY SATES AFFECT- 
e. g., aroused FOCAL 
CONDITIONS 
MENTAL 
BEHAVIOUR- 
FOCAL 
AFFECTIVE AFFECTIVE- AFFECTIVE- 
STATES BEHAVIOURAL COGNITIVE 
CONDITIONS CONDITIONS 
e. g., happy e. g., cheerful e. g., encouraged 
EXTERNAL 
SUBJECTIVE 
EVALUATIONS 
e. g., sexy 
OBJECTIVE 
DESCRIPTIONS 
e. g., abandoned 
COGNITION- 
FOCAL 
BEHAVIOURAL- 
COGNITIVE 
CONDITIONS 
e. g., careful 
COGNITIVE 
CONDITIONS 
e. g., certain 
Fig. 4: Taxonomy of psychological conditions (based on Ortony, Clore, and Foss, 1987). Ellipses 
depict psychological conditions and rectangles show the features that differentiate them. 
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Ortony and colleagues proposed that the best examples of emotions are those words that 
fall into the Affective Conditions class, i. e., psychological conditions that are internal, 
mental, and affect-focal. The second paper provided empirical support for the theoretical 
taxonomy (Clore, Ortony, and Foss, 1987). In the study, participants rated their confidence 
that words from the lexicon referred to an emotion in the two contexts of feeling something 
and being something. The researchers predicted that the words they had pre-experimentally 
(or rationally) classified in the Affective Conditions class, i. e., emotions, would score 
highly in both contexts, that Cognitive Conditions would score moderately in both, that 
scores in both contexts would be low for Physical and Bodily States, and that for External 
Conditions scores would be high in the feeling context and low in the being context. Using 
discriminant analysis, the predictions were correct for the majority of words in each class. 
However, a minority of words that were rationally classified as emotions are empirically 
classified as one of the other three classes, and vice versa. 
Returning to this study, 24 participants (80%) made use of the other category, contributing 
a total of 116 different words or phrases. These responses were classed as an emotion if 
they appeared in the Affective Conditions class of the affective lexicon for either the 
rational classification, or the empirical classification, or both. Responses that did not appear 
in the Affective Conditions class in either context (rational or empirical) were reclassified 
as neutral. A thesaurus was used to identify synonyms for the resulting 30 responses that 
were classed as emotions (Compact Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus; OUP, 2002). For 28 of 
these, synonyms were found either directly (e. g., annoyed = angry), or through two steps 
(e. g., amused = pleased = happy), making it possible to reclassify each response as one of 
the six emotional classes (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, or surprise) or, in the 
single case of apathy, as neutral. One response, gobsmacked, did not appear in the 
(American) lexicon; the dictionary definition of this word confirmed it is an informal 
British term for "utterly astonished" (OUP, 2002). Astonished, which did appear in the 
lexicon as an empirically classified Affective Condition, was then transformed to surprise 
as a direct synonym. Finally, violent was empirically classified as an Affective Condition; 
however, there were no synonyms in the thesaurus used that made it possible to map this 
word to one of the seven basic emotion classifications (including neutral). Violent occurred 
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on only one occasion, and was accompanied by a response of anger on the same trial. On 
this basis, violent was assumed to constitute an elaboration of anger, rather than an 
additional emotion. The mapping for all words in the other category can be found in 
Appendix L. 
The second stage of recoding the recognition data involved collapsing the sometimes 
multiple responses made by participants on a single trial, into one, dominant emotional 
class. In the majority of cases, this was done by simply selecting the response with the 
highest strength rating. The small minority of trials on which two or more emotional classes 
were rated with equal strength (<2% of trials) were treated as missing data, rather than 
arbitrarily selecting a single emotion as predominant. 
Rates of recognition 
Using the recoded data, recognition rates were calculated for each participant for each 
emotional class (as percentage correct). Responses of either fear or surprise to the 
fear/surprise clips were designated correct. Recognition rates varied substantially between 
emotional classes: Mean = 62.1%, SD = 18.2, Range = 36.4 - 93.2%, in the DSPD group; 
Mean = 73.4%, SD = 10.5, Range = 19.4 - 95.8%, in the prison control group; and Mean = 
72.3%, SD = 12.5, Range = 50 - 95%, in the university control group. 
Tests of normality and homogeneity of variance were carried out on the recognition scores 
(see Table 17). While not all variables were normally distributed, variance was similar 
between groups for all recognition variables. ANOVAs tend to be robust to violations of a 
single assumption (Lindman, 1974); one-way between-participant ANOVAs were therefore 
carried out on the data to compare group mean recognition scores, with group as the 
between-participants factor and recognition scores as the dependent variables. The results 
of these tests are summarised in Table 18, which shows that there is a significant effect of 
group on recognition of anger, F(2,27) = 4.7, p=0.02, co = 0.45. 
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Recognition Kolmogorov-Smirnov Levene 
variable Group D d. f. Sig. F Sig. 
Anger 
Disgust 
DSPD 
Prison control 
University control 
DSPD 
Prison control 
University control 
0.31 11 0.00* 
0.20 9 0.20 
0.20 10 0.20 
0.19 11 0.20 
0.24 9 0.15 
0.17 10 0.20 
1.13 0.34 
0.05 0.95 
Fear/ DSPD 0.25 11 0.05* 0.84 0.44 
surprise Prison control 0.26 9 0.08 
University control 0.19 10 0.20 
Happiness DSPD 0.40 11 0.00* 0.66 0.52 
Prison control 0.41 9 0.00* 
University control 0.46 10 0.00* 
Sadness DSPD 0.21 11 0.20 0.50 0.61 
Prison control 0.29 9 0.03* 
University control 0.21 10 0.20 
Surprise DSPD 0.31 11 0.00* 1.29 0.29 
Prison control 0.37 9 0.00* 
University control 0.21 10 0.20 
Neutral DSPD 0.18 11 0.20 0.48 0.62 
Prison control 0.29 9 0.03* 
University control 0.22 10 0.19 
Table 17: K-S D-scores and Levene's homogeneity test statistics for recognition scores. For the 
Levene's tests, k-1=2 and N-k= 27 degrees of freedom. *p < 0.05, i. e., a non-normal variable. 
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Recognition 
variable Group Mean SD 
ANOVA 
F Sig. 
Anger DSPD 36.36 25.28 4.71 0.02* 
Prison control 19.44 17.80 
University control 50.00 20.41 
Disgust DSPD 73.86 21.25 0.07 0.93 
Prison control 77.78 27.80 
University control 75.00 22.05 
Fear/ DSPD 67.05 26.97 2.09 0.14 
surprise Prison control 87.50 13.98 
University control 76.25 22.40 
Happiness DSPD 93.18 15.17 0.13 0.88 
Prison control 95.83 6.25 
University control 95.00 12.08 
Sadness DSPD 47.73 21.52 1.86 0.18 
Prison control 63.89 18.16 
University control 53.75 15.65 
Surprise DSPD 73.86 30.85 0.93 0.41 
Prison control 88.89 21.14 
University control 82.50 19.72 
Neutral DSPD 52.27 33.10 2.12 0.14 
Prison control 77.08 27.06 
University control 73.13 27.01 
Table 18: ANOVAs (df = 27,2) carried out on recognition scores. k-1=2 and N- k= 27 degrees 
of freedom. *p < 0.05. 
Tukey's HSD was applied to anger scores in order to identify pairwise differences; this test 
has good statistical power and tightly controls for Type I errors when sample sizes are 
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approximately equal and population variances are likely to be similar (Field, 2005). Normal 
controls were found to have significantly higher scores for recognition of anger than prison 
controls (p = 0.01); there were no significant differences between the DSPD group and 
either of the two control groups. Fig. 11 shows an error bar chart, which clearly illustrates 
the significant group differences on recognition of anger, plus the overlapping confidence 
intervals of the DSPD group with the two control groups on this variable. 
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Fig. 5: Error bar chart showing the group differences on recognition of anger with 95% Confidence 
Interval bars. 
Recognition versus mirroring 
Spearman's rank order correlation coefficients were computed to explore the associations 
between composite mirroring and recognition scores. Data for each group were analysed 
separately, with coefficients calculated for each emotional class. For example, composite 
mirroring of anger was correlated with recognition of anger, and so on for the other 
emotional classes. The results are summarised in Table 19, which shows that the 
DSPD Prison control University control 
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coefficients were non-significant (for Rater 1, Mean r= -0.1 (SD = 0.29), Mean p=0.49 
(SD = 0.25); for Rater 2, Mean r= -0.11 (SD = 0.24), Mean p=0.61 (SD = 0.29)). The only 
finding that came close to significance was the association between mirroring and 
recognition of sadness (Rater 2). However, contrary to hypothesis, this relationship was 
negative, i. e., lower mirroring was associated with increased recognition (r = -0.55, p= 
0.08). 
Group Emotion 
Rater 1 
r Sig. 
Rater 2 
r Sig. 
DSPD Anger 0.33 0.32 0.14 0.68 
Disgust -0.29 0.39 0.01 0.98 
Fear/surprise 0.03 0.92 0.04 0.91 
Happiness -0.10 0.78 -0.05 0.89 
Sadness -0.01 0.97 -0.55 0.08 
Surprise -0.25 0.46 -0.36 0.28 
Prison control Anger 0.40 0.29 -0.02 0.96 
Disgust -0.19 0.63 -0.21 0.59 
Fear/surprise 0.08 0.83 -0.20 0.61 
Happiness 0.14 0.72 0.35 0.35 
Sadness -0.37 0.33 -0.22 0.58 
Surprise -0.44 0.23 0.04 0.92 
University control Anger -0.30 0.39 -0.50 0.14 
Disgust -0.24 0.51 -0.28 0.44 
Fear/surprise -0.32 0.37 0.03 0.93 
Happiness -0.38 0.28 -0.26 0.46 
Sadness -0.37 0.29 -0.20 0.58 
Surprise 0.51 0.13 0.24 0.50 
Table 19: Spearman's rank order correlation coefficients for composite mirroring and recognition. 
60 
Emotional sensitivity 
A measure of emotional sensitivity was computed by calculating the mean strength ratings 
given by participants for each emotional class and overall. Responses of neutral, for which 
participants were not asked to give a strength rating, were given a score of one. On trials 
with two or more strength ratings, a number of possible procedures were considered to 
convert the trial to an overall strength rating. Taking the example of a face rated as seven 
on the anger scale and one on the disgust scale, the ratings could simply be summed; 
however, this would result in the clip having a strength higher than seven - which is 
conceptualised as the most expressive a face can be. A second alternative would be to take 
an average; however, this would diminish the perceived strength of the example given by 
nearly half. It was therefore assumed that the highest (or joint highest) rating on a trial 
gives the most meaningful description of its overall perceived strength. 
Tests of normality and homogeneity of variance on emotional sensitivity scores are 
summarised in Table 17. The picture was mixed, with three variables (sensitivity to anger, 
disgust, and neutral clips) showing significant deviations from the normal distribution for 
one or more groups (p < 0.05), and two variables (sensitivity to sadness and neutral clips) 
lacking homogeneity of variance (F(2,27) = 6.3 5, p<0.01; F(2,27) = 3.85, p<0.05). 
Median sensitivity scores fell within the ranges 1.50 - 5.13 (DSPD group), 1.06 - 5.13 
(prison controls), and 1.19-5.32 (university controls). Statistical tests were applied 
conservatively, i. e., non-parametric tests were used, across all variables when testing for 
group differences. The results of Kruskal-Wallis H tests, with emotional sensitivity scores 
as dependent variables and group as the between-participants factor, are summarised in 
Table 18. None of the group differences reached significance at the 5% level; however, in 
order to identify possible pairwise differences, a more liberal criterion (p < 0.2) was 
applied. For sensitivity to anger, p=0.15, and for sensitivity to neutral clips, p=0.18. 
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Sensitivity 
variable Group 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
D N. Sig. 
Levene 
F Sig. 
Anger DSPD 0.26 11 0.03 0.74 0.48 
Prison control 0.12 9 0.20 
University control 0.22 10 0.19 
Disgust DSPD 0.15 11 0.20 0.03 0.97 
Prison control 0.18 9 0.20 
University control 0.28 10 0.03 
Fear/ DSPD 0.11 11 0.20 3.19 0.06 
surprise Prison control 0.24 9 0.13 
University control 0.20 10 0.20 
Happiness DSPD 0.21 11 0.18 1.18 0.32 
Prison control 0.14 9 0.20 
University control 0.14 10 0.20 
Sadness DSPD 0.20 11 0.20 6.35 0.01 
Prison control 0.17 9 0.20 
University control 0.16 10 0.20 
Surprise DSPD 0.19 11 0.20 1.03 0.37 
Prison control 0.12 9 0.20 
University control 0.15 10 0.20 
Neutral DSPD 0.25 11 0.05 3.85 0.03 
Prison control 0.33 9 0.01 
University control 0.29 10 0.02 
Table 20: K-S D-scores and Levene test statistics for emotional sensitivity scores. For the Levene's 
tests, k-1=2 and N- k= 27 degrees of freedom. 
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Sensitivity 
variable Group Median Min. Max. 
Kruskal-Wallis 
H Sig. 
Anger DSPD 2.88 2.13 6.13 3.74 0.15* 
Prison control 2.38 1.25 4.13 
University control 3.87 1.38 5.25 
Disgust DSPD 4.67 2.88 5.80 2.36 0.31 
Prison control 5.13 3.38 6.25 
University control 5.32 3.29 6.00 
Fear/ DSPD 5.13 2.88 6.75 0.80 0.67 
surprise Prison control 5.13 2.88 5.86 
University control 4.58 4.17 6.00 
Happiness DSPD 5.00 3.25 6.75 1.16 0.56 
Prison control 4.88 3.50 6.25 
University control 5.00 3.17 6.13 
Sadness DSPD 3.29 2.38 5.75 0.51 0.78 
Prison control 3.38 2.25 4.71 
University control 3.46 2.43 4.13 
Surprise DSPD 4.63 3.63 6.80 1.86 0.39 
Prison control 4.25 3.13 5.88 
University control 4.75 3.75 6.25 
Neutral DSPD 1.50 1.00 5.14 3.40 0.18* 
Prison control 1.06 1.00 1.93 
University control 1.19 1.00 3.44 
Table 21: Results of Kruskal-Wallis H tests (d. f. = 2) carried out on emotional sensitivity scores. 
*p < 0.2. 
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Two-tailed pairwise tests were carried out on those variables that came closest to 
significance (p < 0.20); however, none of these reached significance at the 5% level (see 
Table 22). 
Sensitivity 
variable 
Anger 
Neutral 
Groups 
DSPD - Prison controls 
DSPD - University controls 
Prison controls - University controls 
DSPD - Prison controls 
DSPD - University controls 
Prison controls - University controls 
Mann-Whitney 
U Sig. r 
28.50 0.11 -0.29 
49.00 0.71 -0.08 
24.00 0.09 -0.31 
29.00 0.13 -0.29 
47.50 0.61 -0.10 
26.00 0.13 -0.29 
Table 22: Results of Mann-Whitney tests carried out on differences in emotional sensitivity scores 
between pairs of groups. Two-tailed significance levels are reported. 
Number of emotional classes selected 
The number of emotional classes selected per clip was compared across groups, with the 
hypothesis that participants in the university control group would make more selections per 
clip than the prison controls, while the DSPD group would score lowest on this measure. 
This hypothesis was based on the evidence that psychopathy is associated with impairments 
in affect recognition (Blair et al., 2001; Kosson et al., 2002), and on the assumption of 
elevated PCL-R scores in the prison control group, and even greater scores in the DSPD 
group. It was reasoned that the mechanism underlying the impaired recognition shown in 
previous studies, may manifest in this research as a reduction in the tendency to identify 
emotional blends, i. e., make multiple responses on a single trial. 
Fig. 5 shows a boxplot of the number of selections per clip for each group. While data fell 
between one and two selections per clip for all three groups, it is apparent that there was a 
greater range covered by the university controls. 
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Fig. 6: Boxplot showing the number of selections per clip for each group. The circle above DSPD 
indicates a score with a z-value of 1.45, which is not classed as an outlier (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2001). 
Kolmogorov Smirnov D tests indicated that the data for both DSPD and prison controls 
were non-normally distributed (D(11) = 0.27, p=0.03; D(9) = 0.29, p=0.03), and 
Levene's test statistic showed that variances were heterogeneous (F(2,27) = 5.17, p= 
0.01). A Kruskal Wallis H test comparing number of emotions selected per clip across 
groups did not reach significance at the 5% level (H(2) = 5.4, p=0.07). However, as this 
result was close to significance, one-tailed pairwise tests were administered. As predicted, 
university controls (Mdn = 1.24) made more selections per clip than prison controls (Mdn = 
1.03) and participants in the DSPD group (Mdn = 1.05), with medium effect sizes (U= 
19.5, p=0.02, r= -0.38; U= 28, p=0.03, r= -0.35, respectively). However the difference 
between the two prison samples was non-significant. 
DSPD Prison control University control 
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DISCUSSION 
Summary of findings 
The results of this preliminary study do not show convincing evidence for reduced 
mirroring of facial expressions of emotion in prison populations. When more liberal p- 
values were applied, there were tentative suggestions that a larger study, or a more sensitive 
procedure, may reveal group differences. The clearest suggestions (significant only at the 
15% level) were that mirroring of disgust and happiness occurred more frequently among 
university controls than prison controls. Differences between university controls and the 
DSPD group on these measures were also (nonsignificantly) in the predicted direction. 
Applying Leventhal's perceptual-motor theory, it may be hypothesized that the inconsistent 
pairing of specific facial expressions and feeling states during development could disrupt 
the normal activation of the innate central motor programmes. This may occur with 
inconsistent parenting that is perceived by the developing child as frightened or frightening, 
such that both fear and security are evoked by the same source. Such parenting is thought to 
play a causal role in the development of a cluster of interpersonal behaviours labelled 
disorganized attachment style. There is a clear association between disorganized attachment 
and sexual and violent offending in a personality-disordered population (Van Ijzendoorn, 
Feldbrugge, Derks, De Ruiter, Verhagen, Philipse, Vand der Staak, and Riksen-Walraven, 
1997). It is therefore probable that developmental primary caregiver relationships for both 
prison samples were less consistent than those for the university controls. 
An alternative explanation for the possible reduced or absent mirroring in prison 
populations is that the necessary central motor programmes are not present, or else are not 
activated, in some individuals congenitally. According to this interpretation, for such 
individuals mirroring would not occur irrespective of the quality of interpersonal 
relationships during development. As with many other human attributes, teasing apart the 
relative contributions of genes and environment to the development of mirroring would be 
far from straightforward; however, it could be hypothesized that a larger environmental 
contribution would make it feasible that mirroring could be improved using a form of 
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interpersonal skills training, targeting the deficit directly. Conversely, if some individuals 
lack the necessary central motor programmes altogether, it should not be possible to 
normalize true mirroring. 
Because of the uneven strengths among the stimulus clips, it is difficult to draw any firm 
conclusions about the two particular emotional classes (disgust and happiness) for which 
group differences approached significance. However, it is worth noting that during the 
initial ratings of stimuli for the task, the disgust and happiness clips received higher mean 
strength scores than any of the other emotional classes. This fact lends support to the 
hypothesis that stronger facial expressions are more likely to induce mirroring, and may 
indicate that the other clips used in this study were not sufficiently strong. Using a stimulus 
set comprising strong examples of all emotional classes may therefore have revealed more 
global mirroring deficits in the prison groups. 
Contrary to previous studies that have investigated emotional recognition in samples with 
high PCL-R scores, deficits were not found in the recognition of disgust (Kosson et al., 
2002), fear, or sadness (Blair et al., 1997; Blair et al., 2001). The only significant group 
difference was in the recognition of anger, which was found to be higher in the university 
controls than in the prison controls. However, for all three groups, recognition of anger was 
lower than for any other emotional class; moreover, in the initial rating of the stimuli the 
anger clips received the lowest mean strength ratings. An implication of this finding is that 
weaker stimuli may be required in order to reveal group differences in recognition of 
emotion. Taken together with the earlier suggestion that stronger clips are needed in order 
to observe group differences in mirroring, it may be difficult to measure both mirroring and 
recognition in a DSPD population within the same task. A possible solution would be to 
use a combination of extreme and moderate facial stimuli, balanced across emotional 
classes. 
The lack of an association between mirroring and recognition, despite the theoretical 
rationale for there being a positive relationship, is in line with the findings of previous 
research (e. g., Blairy et al., 1999). The one relationship that approached statistical 
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significance in this part of the analysis (the negative association between mirroring and 
recognition of sadness in the DSPD group (Rater 2)) was in the opposite direction to that 
hypothesized. The simplest interpretation is that this association approached significance as 
a consequence of the number of statistical tests carried out without making familywise error 
corrections. Because of the exploratory nature of this research, such procedures were not 
applied, making it more likely that small group differences would be observed, while 
greatly increasing the probability of Type I errors occurring. Alternatively, assuming that 
such a relationship does exist - and taking into consideration the low recognition rate for 
sadness clips (47.7%) - it is possible to speculate that participants in the DSPD group 
expressed sadness (facially) to signal their frustration if they were unable to decode the 
sadness clips. That such a finding was restricted to the DSPD group may say more about 
differing demand characteristics, rather than indicating a generalisable characteristic of 
DSPD. Specifically, participants in the DSPD group were not blind to the fact that they 
formed the experimental group in this research; moreover, these participants were engaged 
in a pilot treatment programme involving extensive assessments; they may therefore have 
placed greater personal importance on their performance in the task than either of the 
control groups, who were similarly un-blinded. 
This is not the first study to use the facial affect recognition paradigm with samples 
possessing elevated PCL-R scores; however, none of the previous studies have employed a 
format that permits multiple responses on each trial. The finding that the university controls 
selected more emotional classes per clip than either of the two prison samples is consistent 
with the hypothesis that individuals with low PCL-R scores are more sensitive to complex 
emotional expressions, i. e., blends of more than one emotion. Comparing the two prison 
samples on this measure, the lack of a difference again leaves the uncontrolled variables 
that may distinguish the university controls from either prison group as potential 
contributing factors. For example, differences in motor speed may have resulted in 
participants in the prison samples finding it difficult to enter multiple responses quickly 
enough before the next trial commenced. However, taking into account the fact that the 
majority of participants in all three groups labelled at least some clips with more than one 
emotion, it can be assumed that the time available to make responses was sufficient. This 
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finding could be pursued in future research, given the increased ecological validity of faces 
depicting emotional blends over the prototypical faces that have been used previously. 
Within- and between-group variability 
The findings that came closest to significance were between the university and either one or 
both of the prison groups, while there were no group differences between the two prison 
samples. It is likely, based on studies of comparable populations, that the groups differed as 
predicted in terms of psychopathy scores and severity of personality disorders, i. e., that 
these were highest in the DSPD group and lowest in the university controls. For example, 
Forth, Brown, Hart, and Hare (1996) obtained mean PCL: SV score of 6.4 (SD = 5.03) in a 
sample of 75 male university students, while Cooke, Michie, Hart, and Clark (2005) 
reported a mean PCL-R score of 16.1 (SD = 8.3) in a sample of 1,316 adult male offenders 
in the United Kingdom. These figures are substantially lower than the known mean PCL-R 
score of the DSPD group in this research (28.4; SD = 3.6), and even the lowest DSPD 
group PCL-R score (24) lies more than one standard deviation above the Cooke et al. 
(2005) forensic sample. Similarly, the Office for National Statistics reports on psychiatric 
morbidity (Singleton, Bumpstead, O'Brien, Lee, and Meltzer, 2001; Singleton, Meltzer, 
and Gatward, 1998) estimated the prevalence for any personality disorder is approximately 
5% in males living in private households (N = 638) and 64% in male sentenced prisoners 
(N= 258). These figures are again substantially lower than the known frequency of 
personality disorder diagnoses in the DSPD group: ten of the eleven participants (91 %) had 
received at least one such diagnosis. It is also likely that the way in which prisoners get 
onto the DSPD Programme entails that they have been identified by professionals as 
presenting somewhat differently to the general prison population. However, because the 
actual PCL-R scores and diagnoses were not available for the control groups - and the self- 
reported figure of only one personality disorder from the prison control group is highly 
likely to be an underestimate - it is not clear that the groups did in fact differ sufficiently on 
these variables. Moreover, it is possible that the university sample differed from the two 
prison samples on a number of variables that were not measured, including level of 
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education and ethnicity, because of researcher oversight. These additional, unknown 
sources of variance are a limitation of this research. 
A further complicating factor concerns the inherent heterogeneity in a group falling under 
the working definition of "Dangerous people with severe personality disorder". There may 
be clinical merits to the terms dangerous and severe in distinguishing personality disorders 
with relatively little impact on services from those which are a major concern (Tyrer, 
2004); however, the underlying pathologies that characterize this population may be 
sufficiently diverse to obscure any specific deficits that are pertinent to a more narrowly 
defined subgroup. In addition to consistently high PCL-R scores, the DSPD group also had 
a range of personality disorder diagnoses, predominantly within Cluster B but also 
comorbid with Cluster A or B; two participants had diagnoses from all three clusters. There 
is evidence for similarities between different personality disorders for certain aspects of 
emotional processing, such as the physiological responses of patients with BPD and 
patients with avoidant personality disorder to standardized emotional stimuli (Herpertz et 
al., 2000) or the reduced facial responsiveness of forensic patients with either BPD or 
psychopathy when viewing pleasant or unpleasant slides (Herpertz, Dietrich, Wenning, 
Krings, Erberich, Willmes, Thron, and Saß, 2001). However, there are also indications that 
different diagnoses can give rise to contrasting responses in situations with an affective 
component, such as the finding in the Herpertz et al. (2001) study that, while the BPD and 
psychopathic samples were similar in their lack of facial responsiveness, patients with BPD 
(unlike the psychopathic sample) showed electrodermal responses similar to the non- 
clinical sample. Also, Arntz et al. (2003) found that patients with BPD experience 
heightened subjective emotional responses to footage depicting abuse relative to patients 
with Cluster C personality disorders or non-clinical controls. With a phenomenon such as 
the mirroring of facial expressions of emotion, there may be multiple factors influencing its 
presence or absence in different individuals who meet the current working definition of 
DSPD; within-group variability may therefore be more a reflection of pathology than the 
distribution of an attribute within an homogeneous population. 
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Strengths and weaknesses of the stimulus set 
One of the key strengths of this research lay in the use of dynamic, spontaneous expressions 
of emotion, in contrast with the still, posed images used in the vast majority of emotion 
recognition and mirroring studies (e. g., Izard, 1971; Ekman and Friesen, 1971; Kosson et 
al., 2002; Wallbott, 1991, Sonnby-Borgström, 2002; Sonnby-Borgström et al., 2003). As 
there are currently no widely available, validated stimulus sets of this nature - and creating 
such a set was beyond the scope of this research - clips were selected from an existing 
database. Despite this containing a large number of video clips depicting different 
expressions of emotion, it was not possible to equate perceived strength ratings across 
emotional classes, without the resulting stimulus set comprising only weak examples of 
each emotional class. The findings of (close to significant) between-group differences in 
mirroring and recognition for specific emotions are confounded by this fact; however, as 
the group differences in mirroring were associated with the strongest clips, and the 
differences in recognition were associated with the weakest clips, it is possible to speculate 
that the differences observed may be more global. 
There remains a strong case for using dynamic facial expressions of emotion: they have far 
more in common with the typical faces that people encounter in everyday life than do 
photographs. However, capturing a large enough number of spontaneous expressions in a 
controlled environment - that are sufficiently extreme to induce mirroring - may be 
impractical. An alternative approach, constituting something of a compromise, would be to 
compile a database of dynamic, posed expressions. Individuals with some formal training in 
acting would potentially make suitable participants, given that one of the core attributes of 
an effective actor is an ability to pass off as genuine what are in fact artificial emotional 
expressions. 
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Measurement of mirroring 
Mirroring was low in all three groups and across emotional classes. While this is likely to 
reflect in part the weakness of some of the clips and the naturally low prevalence of the 
phenomenon, it may also be a consequence of the method used to measure mirroring. EMG 
would have provided the most accurate measurements of muscular movements, and is the 
method recommended by Tassinary and Cacioppo (1992) to detect weak facial expressions. 
However, one of the aims of this study was to develop a means to measure mirroring that 
could be incorporated into clinical assessment and treatment evaluation. EMG requires both 
specialist equipment and training that are prohibitively expensive. The Facial Action 
Coding System (FACS) provides a highly structured procedure for measuring facial 
expressions without the need for equipment, but again specialist training is needed. A 
further, conceptual argument can be made against these alternative methods: assuming that 
mirroring has a social, communicative purpose, it is those responses that are detectable by 
untrained (but socialized) humans that truly constitute the phenomenon of interest, rather 
than imperceptible muscular twitches or complex displays that need to be deciphered using 
a manual. 
The sound theoretical rationale for the method employed here notwithstanding, the low 
interrater reliability implies that some form of coaching would have benefitted raters. It 
may have sufficed to have shown them a sample of prototypical faces prior to carrying out 
the rating, or alternatively to have asked raters to attempt the same facial affect recognition 
task as the participants completed. This latter suggestion could have provided an effective 
way to sensitize the raters to the subtle echoes displayed on the faces of the participants. 
In addition to the two sets of mirroring scores generated by having two raters, scores were 
also reported in both a raw and a composite form. The raw scores indicated the percentage 
of trials on which there was a match between the emotional class of the clip being viewed, 
and the label selected by the rater. The composite scores took the raw measures for any 
particular emotional class, and subtracted the percentage of clips corresponding to neutral 
trials that were labelled by raters as the same particular class. This adjustment was made in 
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order to control for possible group differences in natural facial expressions that had nothing 
to do with responding to particular classes of stimulus. Only one significant group 
difference disappeared as a consequence of the adjustment: the increased tendency of 
participants in the DSPD group to mirror anger. It could be argued that changing the scores 
in this way in fact eliminated a real effect, i. e., that individuals with DSPD do in fact mirror 
anger in an exaggerated way. Theoretically, such an effect could be a consequence of 
elevated trait anger in this group, although as this was not measured such an interpretation 
is purely speculative. Moreover, the effect was only present in the data from Rater 1 who, 
as was stated earlier, was not perfectly blind to the identity of members of the DSPD group. 
It may therefore be an artifact of unintentional bias. 
Implications 
In order for readily observable mirroring to occur, stimuli are likely to have to comprise 
strong examples of facial expressions of emotion, which may only be practicably 
obtainable by resorting to posed expressions. Power calculations for the effect sizes 
reported here (Range of r=0.31 - 0.39) indicate that sample sizes of 88 - 138 would be 
required to achieve a statistical power of 0.95, which although not large compared with 
many studies, may be impractical at present given the small DSPD population in England, 
which runs into the hundreds rather than thousands. Moreover, exposing a severely 
personality disordered sample of this size to even extreme and exaggerated expressions 
may not result in mirroring, a finding that would be consistent with research investigating 
the association between mirroring and empathy (Sonnby-Borgström, 2002; Sonnby- 
Borgström et al., 2003). Whether the mechanism (or mechanisms) underlying this and other 
affective deficits seen in DSPD would be amenable to therapeutic intervention is at present 
unknown. There is a growing body of research suggesting that personality is not, as was 
once thought, stable over long periods of time (e. g., Shea et al., 2002; Johnson, Cohen, 
Kasen, Skodol, Hamagami, and Brook, 2000; Seivewright et al., 2002). Treatment that aims 
to rehabilitate the interpersonal and affective functioning of people currently defined as 
dangerous and having a severe personality disorder, may result in the normalisation of such 
73 
behaviours as the mirroring of facial expressions of emotion. Alternatively, simply 
informing individuals that they have a deficit in mirroring, i. e., bringing it into their 
conscious awareness, may itself constitute a direct way to target this difference in one 
aspect of social functioning. The procedure described here, incorporating the refinements 
suggested, could provide a means to assess mirroring. If it was possible to overcome the 
limitations of sample size, it could also be used in a dismantling study, with pre- and post- 
treatment testing being applied to compare groups receiving regular treatment and those 
receiving treatments targeted specifically at improving mirroring. 
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APPENDIX B: Letter of invitation (DSPD) 
Date 
Dear 
I am a Psychologist in Clinical Training at the University of Leeds, and I am currently 
carrying out some research at HMP Whitemoor. I am investigating how prisoners on the 
DSPD Programme respond to facial expressions of emotion, such as "happiness", "anger", 
"surprise", etc. I wish to work with people with a diagnosis of personality disorder when 
my training is completed, and I am keen to be involved in a project that can help improve 
understanding of what it means to have such a diagnosis. 
Details of the proposed project can found on the enclosed Participant Information Sheet. 
Should you wish to take part, it is estimated that your participation will take around half an 
hour. Your participation is voluntary and not participating will not affect your normal care 
in any way. Also, you are free to end your participation at any time and are not expected to 
give any reason for why you have changed your mind. 
I hope that you will consider taking part in this research project, as in addition to increasing 
our understanding of what it means to have a diagnosis of severe personality disorder, it 
may also aid in the evaluation of the treatment programme with which you are currently 
involved. 
If you have further questions about the research that you wish to be answered, you are 
welcome to ask Dr Naomi Murphy, who has agreed to act as my point of contact on the 
wing. However, all prisoners will be given the opportunity to have any questions answered 
directly by myself before agreeing to take part. 
Yours sincerely, 
Keith Whittle 
Psychologist in Clinical Training 
University of Leeds 
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APPENDIX C: Letter of invitation to (prison control) 
Date 
Dear 
I am a Psychologist in Clinical Training at the University of Leeds, and I am currently 
carrying out some research at HMP Whitemoor. I am investigating how prisoners on the 
Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder (DSPD) Programme respond to facial 
expressions of emotion, such as "happiness", "anger", "surprise", etc. I am writing to you, 
as a person who does not have a diagnosis of severe personality disorder, to invite you to 
form part of a group that would be compared with a group of DSPD prisoners and also with 
a group of people who are not prisoners. In this way, I would be able to see how the 
responses of people with a diagnosis of severe personality disorder might differ from 
people such as yourself who do not have such a diagnosis. Your responses would not be 
used to assess you personally in any way. 
Details of the proposed project can found on the enclosed Participant Information Sheet. 
Should you wish to take part, it is estimated that your participation will take around half an 
hour. Your participation is voluntary and not participating will not affect your normal care 
in any way. Also, you are free to end your participation at any time and are not expected to 
give any reason for why you have changed your mind. 
I hope that you will consider taking part in this research project, as it may make a valuable 
contribution to our understanding of what it means to have a diagnosis of severe personality 
disorder. 
If you have further questions about the research that you wish to be answered, you are 
welcome to ask SO Dave Watson or SO Barry Leban, who have agreed to act as my points 
of contact on the wing. However, all prisoners will be given the opportunity to have any 
questions answered directly by myself before agreeing to take part. 
Yours sincerely, 
Keith Whittle 
Psychologist in Clinical Training 
University of Leeds 
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APPENDIX D: Participant information sheet (DSPD) 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
RESPONSES TO FACIAL EXPRESSIONS OF EMOTION 
Information about the project: 
I am a researcher in the Institute of Psychological Sciences at the University of Leeds. I am 
interested in how people with a diagnosis of Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder 
(DSPD) recognise and react to emotions in others. 
This research is subject to ethical guidelines set out by the British Psychological Society. 
These include obtaining your informed consent, making clear that you are free to withdraw 
your consent at any time before the research is completed, and ensuring that you cannot be 
identified by name in the final results. This sheet will hopefully provide you with enough 
information about the study to allow you to make an informed decision about participation. 
However, if you have any questions or would like to discuss anything with me please let 
me know. 
What it will involve 
I would like you to take part because I am approaching you as a potential participant, as 
you are currently involved in the DSPD treatment programme at HMP Whitemoor. I am 
interested in looking at your responses to a task in which you are asked to watch a series of 
short video clips of human faces. During the task, you would be asked to label the emotion 
that you feel is being expressed by each face, such as "happiness", "anger", "surprise", etc. 
You would be filmed during the task, and the recording would be used to help me to 
analyse your responses. The recording would only be viewed by the following people: 
myself, my research supervisors, and a small group of prison staff. Your responses will 
then be compared with those of a group of prisoners at HMP Whitemoor who are not 
involved in the DSPD programme, and also with a group of people from the community. 
What will happen to the information? 
The information about your responses will be made anonymous and combined with the 
information from other participants, so that it will not be possible to name or identify you at 
all in any final reports. These reports could include presentations at conferences and articles 
in scientific journals. 
The video footage will be destroyed no more than 12 months after the study is 
completed, and will not be used as part of any presentation. 
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Benefits of participating 
Participating in this research is voluntary and the choice not to participate will not affect 
your normal care or treatment in any way. 
It is hoped that the findings of this research will help to improve understanding about how 
people with DSPD experience and make sense of emotions. The task that you are being 
asked to do may also be developed to help evaluate the progress that prisoners make in 
treatment at HMP Whitemoor. 
I would be very grateful for any help you can give me with this research. If you wish to 
withdraw your consent to participate at any time, you are free to do so and your decision 
will be respected without you having to give a reason, and without affecting your normal 
care or treatment in any way. 
Further questions 
Should you have any further questions about this research, I will be happy to meet with you 
and discuss them before you agree to take part. 
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APPENDIX E: Participant information sheet (prison control) 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET (PRISONER CONTROL GROUP) 
RESPONSES TO FACIAL EXPRESSIONS OF EMOTION 
Information about the project: 
I am a researcher in the Institute of Psychological Sciences at the University of Leeds. I am 
interested in how people with a diagnosis of Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder 
(DSPD) recognise and react to emotions in others. 
This research is subject to ethical guidelines set out by the British Psychological Society. 
These include obtaining your informed consent, making clear that you are free to withdraw 
your consent at any time before the research is completed, and ensuring that you cannot be 
identified by name in the final results. This sheet will hopefully provide you with enough 
information about the study to allow you to make an informed decision about participation. 
However, if you have any questions or would like to discuss anything with me please let 
me know. 
What it will involve 
I would like you to take part because I am approaching you as a potential research 
participant to help form part of a group that will be compared with a group of prisoners on 
the DSPD programme at HMP Whitemoor, and also with another group of people from the 
community. The contribution from you would be combined with that of other people in 
your group, so that you would not be personally identifiable in any final reports. These 
combined results would then be used to help me make sense of the results from the other 
two groups. Your responses would not be used to assess you personally in any way. 
I am interested in looking at your responses to a task in which you are asked to watch a 
series of short video clips of human faces. During the task, you would be asked to label the 
emotion that you feel is being expressed by each face, such as "happiness", "anger", 
"surprise", etc. You would be filmed during the task, and the recording would be used to 
help me to analyse your responses. The recording would only be viewed by the following 
people: myself, my research supervisors, and a small group of prison staff. 
What will happen to the information? 
The information about your responses will be made anonymous and combined with the 
information from other participants, so that it will not be possible to name or identify you at 
all in any final reports. These reports could 
include presentations at conferences and articles 
in scientific journals. 
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The video footage will be destroyed no more than 12 months after the study is 
completed, and will not be used as part of any presentation. 
Benefits of participating 
Participating in this research is voluntary and the choice not to participate will not affect 
your normal care or treatment in any way. 
It is hoped that the findings of this research will help to improve understanding about how 
people with DSPD experience and make sense of emotions. The task that you are being 
asked to do may also be developed to help evaluate the progress that prisoners in the DSPD 
Programme make in treatment at HMP Whitemoor. 
I would be very grateful for any help you can give me with this research. If you wish to 
withdraw your consent to participate at any time, you are free to do so and your decision 
will be respected without you having to give a reason, and without affecting your normal 
care or treatment in any way. 
Further questions 
Should you have any further questions about this research, I will be happy to meet with you 
and discuss them before you agree to take part. 
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APPENDIX F: Participant information sheet (university control) 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET (CONTROL GROUP) 
RESPONSES TO FACIAL EXPRESSIONS OF EMOTION 
Information about the project: 
I am a researcher in the Institute of Psychological Sciences at the University of Leeds. I am 
interested in how people with a diagnosis of Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder 
(DSPD) recognise and react to emotions in others. 
This research is subject to ethical guidelines set out by the British Psychological Society. 
These include obtaining your informed consent, making clear that you are free to withdraw 
your consent at any time before the research is completed, and ensuring that you cannot be 
identified by name in the final results. This sheet will hopefully provide you with enough 
information about the study to allow you to make an informed decision about participation. 
However, if you have any questions or would like to discuss anything with me please let 
me know. 
What it will involve 
I would like you to take part because I am approaching you as a potential research 
participant to help form part of a group that will be compared with a group of prisoners on 
the DSPD programme at HMP Whitemoor, and also with another group of prisoners at 
HMP Whitemoor who are not on the DSPD programme. The contribution from you would 
be combined with that of other people in your group, so that you would not be personally 
identifiable in any final reports. These combined results would then be used to help me 
make sense of the results from the other two groups. Your responses would not be used to 
assess you personally in any way. 
I am interested in looking at your responses to a task in which you are asked to watch a 
series of short video clips of human faces. During the task, you would be asked to label the 
emotion that you feel is being expressed by each face, such as "happiness", "anger", 
"surprise", etc. You would be filmed during the task, and the recording would be used to 
help me to analyse your responses. The recording would only be viewed by the following 
people: myself, my research supervisors, and a small group of prison staff. 
What will happen to the information? 
The information about your responses will be made anonymous and combined with the 
information from other participants, so that it will not be possible to name or identify you at 
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all in any final reports. These reports could include presentations at conferences and articles 
in scientific journals. 
The video footage will be destroyed no more than 12 months after the study is 
completed, and will not be used as part of any presentation. 
Benefits ofparticipating 
It is hoped that the findings of this research will help to improve understanding about how 
people with DSPD experience and make sense of emotions. The task that you are being 
asked to do may also be developed to help evaluate the progress that prisoners in the DSPD 
Programme make in treatment at HIM Whitemoor. 
I would be very grateful for any help you can give me with this research. If you wish to 
withdraw your consent to participate at any time, you are free to do so and your decision 
will be respected without you having to give a reason, and without affecting your legal 
rights in any way. 
Further questions 
Should you have any further questions about this research, I will be happy to answer them 
before you agree to take part. 
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APPENDIX G: Informed consent form (prison) 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
FACIAL EXPRESSIONS OF EMOTION INVESTIGATION 
The purpose of this form is to help us ensure you are willing to take part in this study and 
understand our willingness to accommodate you in any way we can. Because we need to 
keep a record of this the language is rather more formal than we would like. Signing this 
form does not commit you to anything you do not wish to do. 
Please circle as appropriate 
" Have you read the participant information sheet? Yes / No 
" Have you had the opportunity to ask questions and 
discuss the study? Yes / No 
" Have you received satisfactory answers to your questions? Yes / No 
" Do you understand that your participation is voluntary and 
you are free to withdraw: 
At any time? Yes / No 
Without having to give a reason for withdrawing? Yes / No 
Without having your care, treatment or legal rights Yes / No 
affected in any way? 
" Do you agree to be video-recorded during this study? Yes / No 
(The recordings will be viewed only by the researchers and 
a panel of raters, who will be staff at the prison. All video 
recordings will be destroyed after completion of the study). 
" Do you agree to take part in this study? Yes/No 
Signed .............................................. 
Date.................... . 
Name in block capitals: ............................................................ 
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APPENDIX H: Informed consent form (university) 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM (UNIVERSITY PARTICIPANTS) 
FACIAL EXPRESSIONS OF EMOTION INVESTIGATION 
The purpose of this form is to help us ensure you are willing to take part in this study and 
understand our willingness to accommodate you in any way we can. Because we need to 
keep a record of this the language is rather more formal than we would like. Signing this 
form does not commit you to anything you do not wish to do. 
Please circle as appropriate 
" Have you read the participant information sheet? Yes / No 
" Have you had the opportunity to ask questions and 
discuss the study? Yes / No 
" Have you received satisfactory answers to your questions? Yes / No 
" Do you understand that your participation is voluntary and 
you are free to withdraw: 
At any time? 
Without having to give a reason for withdrawing? 
Without having your legal rights affected? 
" Do you agree to be video-recorded during this study? 
(The recordings will be viewed only by the researchers and 
a panel of raters, who will be staff at HMP Whitemoor. All 
video recordings will be destroyed after completion of the 
study). 
0 Do you agree to take part in this study? 
Yes / No 
Yes / No 
Yes / No 
Yes / No 
Yes/No 
Signed .............................................. 
Date.................... . 
Name in block capitals: ............................................................ 
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APPENDIX I: Instructions for the initial rating task 
You will be shown a series of short video clips of peoples' faces. 
After you have viewed each clip, decide which emotion label best fits the facial expression 
you have just seen from the following selection: 
anger disgust fear happiness sadness surprise neutral 
Then rate the strength of the facial expression using the following scale: 
12345H6H7 
weak strong 
If you decide that there is no facial expression of emotion, simply state neutral and you 
don't need to then rate the strength. 
If you decide that the clip would best be described by more than one of the above terms, 
state blend then indicate which of the above emotions best describes the expression and 
rate each one on the 7-point scale. 
If you decide that the facial expression depicts a different emotion not included in the 
selection above, state the word that best describes the emotion and rate 
it on the 7-point 
scale. 
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APPENDIX J: Instructions for the main task 
" You will be presented with a number of short video clips of peoples' faces. 
" After you have seen each face, you will have a short time to choose the emotion 
word or words that best describe the face that you have just seen. 
" The choices are: 
Anger Disgust Fear Happiness Sadness Surprise Other Neutral 
" Mark your choice on the answer sheet provided by circling a number underneath the 
emotion word from 1 to 7, where 1 is the weakest and 7 is the strongest expression 
of that particular emotion. 
" For faces that you decide are "neutral", that is, faces that are not expressing an 
emotion, just circle the word "neutral" on the answer sheet. 
" You may decide that more than one emotion word is needed to describe the face. 
" If so, just circle a number under each emotion word that is needed from 1 (weak) to 
7 (strong). 
" You may also decide that a different word would be better to describe the face. 
" If so, write this word on the answer sheet where it says "Other (please state)", and 
circle a number underneath it from 1 (weak) to 7 (strong). 
PRACTICE 
" To help you get used to the task there will first be a short practice. 
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" During the practice you will be given more time between each video clip at first, but 
then the time will get shorter as you get used to the task. 
" After the practice, you will be able to do the main task as soon as you are ready. 
" You will also be able to have a break halfway through the main task. 
" Try not to think about it too much: it's your first answer that we are interested in. 
Remember, there are no right answers! 
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APPENDIX K: Instructions for the final rating task 
You will be shown a series of short video clips of peoples' faces. 
The people were filmed while also viewing video clips, depicting a range of different facial 
expressions of emotion that included anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise, and 
neutral. 
Sometimes people mirror the facial expressions that they see. 
It is your task with each clip to try and guess which emotion the person was seeing. Please 
do this by choosing one of the following labels for each clip: 
anger disgust fear happiness sadness surprise neutral 
If you cannot see any emotional expression on a face that you are viewing, label it as 
neutral. 
Indicate your answers on the response sheet by drawing a line through the label you have 
chosen for each clip. 
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APPENDIX L: Transformation of other responses 
Response (lexicon 
entry if different) Rational Empirical Relevant thesaurus entry(s) Reclassification 
annoyed affective affective annoyed = angry anger 
disapproval affective affective disapproval = anger anger 
(disapprove-of) 
fed up affective affective fed up = annoyed = angry anger 
violent* cognitive affective - anger 
contempt affective affective contempt = disgust disgust 
concern affective affective concern = fear fear 
concerned affective affective concerned = fearful fear 
excited affective affective excited = agitated = worry = fear fear 
or excited = nervous = fearful 
worried affective affective worried = fearful fear 
worry affective affective worry = fear fear 
amused affective affective amused = pleased = happy happiness 
amusement affective cognitive amusement = delight = happiness happiness 
content affective affective content = happy happiness 
(contented) 
mildly amused affective affective amused = pleased = happy happiness 
pleased affective affective pleased happy happiness 
pride affective affective pride = happiness happiness 
relaxed affective affective relaxed = happy happiness 
serene affective external serene = contented = happy happiness 
smugness (smug) affective cognitive smug = pleased = happy happiness 
* This word occurred on only one occasion and was accompanied by a higher rating for anger. The 
decision to reclassify violent in this way (in the absence of an appropriate entry in the thesaurus) 
therefore made no difference to the analysis. 
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Response (lexicon 
entry if different) 
Transformation of other responses (continued) 
Rational Empirical Relevant thesaurus entry(s) Reclassification 
disappointed 
disappointment 
grief 
lonely 
unhappy 
affective affective disappointed = sad 
affective affective disappointment = sadness 
affective affective grief = sadness 
affective affective lonely = sad 
affective affective unhappy = sad 
sadness 
sadness 
sadness 
sadness 
sadness 
amazed cognitive affective amazed = surprised surprise 
gobsmacked cognitive affective astonished = surprised surprise 
(astonished)* 
pretend shock affective affective shock = surprise surprise 
(shock) 
shock affective affective shock = surprise surprise 
shocked affective affective shocked = surprised surprise 
actor - - neutral 
aggressive cognitive external neutral 
agreeing - - neutral 
agreement - - neutral 
aloof cognitive cognitive neutral 
anticipation - - neutral 
apathy affective affective apathetic = indifferent = neutral neutral 
attentive - - neutral 
bemused - - neutral 
blank - - neutral 
boredom cognitive physical/ neutral 
bodily 
cold - - neutral 
*Gobsmacked: "adj. Brit. informal utterly astonished" (dictionary entry; OUP, 2002). 
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Transformation of other responses (continued) 
Response (lexicon 
entry if different) Rational Empirical Relevant thesaurus entry(s) Reclassification 
confused cognitive cognitive neutral 
confusion cognitive cognitive neutral 
consternation neutral 
contemplation - - neutral 
curious cognitive physical/ neutral 
bodily 
cynicism (cynical) cognitive cognitive neutral 
dazed physical/ physical/ neutral 
bodily bodily 
disagreement - - neutral 
disbelief - - neutral 
discomfort - - neutral 
disinterest - - neutral 
disparaging - - neutral 
doesn't understand - - neutral 
don't know look - - neutral 
doubt cognitive physical! neutral 
bodily 
doubtful cognitive cognitive neutral 
dubious - - neutral 
expectant cognitive cognitive neutral 
expressionless - - neutral 
false - - neutral 
friendly cognitive external neutral 
gay - _ neutral 
glazed - - neutral 
grimace - - neutral 
growl - - neutral 
illness - - neutral 
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Transformation of other responses (continued) 
Response (lexicon 
entry if different) Rational Empirical Relevant thesaurus entry(s) Reclassification 
impassive - - neutral 
in thought - - neutral 
indifference cognitive Physical! neutral 
bodily 
interest cognitive Physical/ neutral 
bodily 
interested cognitive cognitive neutral 
jolly - - neutral 
lack of interest - - neutral 
learning - - neutral 
lethargic - - neutral 
listening - - neutral 
lost - - neutral 
maybe - - neutral 
mistrust - - neutral 
misunderstanding - - neutral 
moody - - neutral 
musing - - neutral 
no man's land - - neutral 
nonplus - - neutral 
not amused - - neutral 
not sure - - neutral 
pain Physical/ Physical/ neutral 
bodily bodily 
perplexed cognitive cognitive neutral 
put on - - neutral 
puzzled - - neutral 
quizzical - - neutral 
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Transformation of other responses (continued) 
Response (lexicon 
entry if different) Rational Empirical Relevant thesaurus entry(s) Reclassification 
received good - - neutral 
news 
reflecting - - neutral 
reflection on self - - neutral 
resignation cognitive cognitive neutral 
(resigned) 
silly cognitive external neutral 
skeptical cognitive Physical/ neutral 
bodily 
stoned - - neutral 
stressed - - neutral 
studious - - neutral 
subdued - - neutral 
superior external external neutral 
thinking - - neutral 
thoughtful - - neutral 
thoughtfulness - - neutral 
tired Physical/ Physical/ neutral 
bodily bodily 
ugly - - neutral 
uncertain cognitive cognitive neutral 
unknowing - - neutral 
unsure - - neutral 
unsure look - - neutral 
unsureness - - neutral 
watchful - - neutral 
weirdo - - neutral 
you what - - neutral 
